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 Abstract 
 
This monograph focuses on a proposal for a testing model in safety 
critical systems. Due to the large scope of these systems we have focused on 
the system testing and we have included requirements for testing the 
communication subsystem. 
After establishing the theoretical background for testing, we have 
analysed the issues of safety critical systems. In this analysis we have also 
focused on industrial networks and their security. Subsequently we have 
defined the differences and specifics of traditional software systems and 
safety critical systems, based on standards and guidelines analysis for 
various safety critical systems. Requirements gained by this analysis have 
been generalized to use in any safety critical system. 
The system testing that we are using is not clearly integrated into the 
process of design and development of safety critical systems. Therefore we 
have proposed basic steps of this process to which we have integrated 
system testing. To capture this process we have used appropriate UML 
diagrams. 
Given the scope of the system testing we have decided to propose two 
testing models. We have focused on performance and step stress testing. 
These models implement requirements for testing of safety critical systems 
specified by us. To capture these models we have used appropriate UML 
diagrams. 
To verify the proposed models, we have defined a metric. Based on its 
value we can determine whenever the proposed model meets testing 
requirements specified by us. 
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6 
 Scientific contribution 
 
The main scientific contribution is the model design of the step stress 
and performance testing of safety-critical systems. The specification of 
requirements for safety-critical systems testing and the processing of 
various support activities were needed during the testing process execution. 
In the first part we have analysed the relevant standards and guidelines 
for safety-critical systems. The analysed standards are focused mostly on 
the integration testing. The system testing is mentioned as one of the tests 
which must be executed. The concrete analysed requirements mentioned in 
the standards are specific so they can not be all included into a design 
model. Therefore we have specified the requirements considering the 
selected system testing based on the standard analysis. The requirements 
which must be considered by a system testing are not contained in any 
standard or guideline and therefore this specification can be understood as 
one of the monograph contribution. 
Based on the analysed standards we have identified and proposed the 
basic steps of design and development of safety-critical systems. Every step 
of our designed model has defined the actions and requirements needed for 
a process. Then we have identified and specified the requirements and data 
necessary for a system testing of safety-critical systems. The designed steps 
as well as specified requirements and data have been integrated into 
a standard model of design and development of safety-critical systems. This 
integration of system testing into the process of design and development of 
safety-critical systems can be also considered as the monograph 
contribution. 
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 After the specification of requirements for testing and the previous 
design we have started the model designs of a communication subsystem 
testing by safety-critical control systems. We have focused on two types of 
the system tests, specifically the step stress testing and the performance 
testing. These models come from the identical outputs while every one is 
focused on a testing of other system aspects. The designed models of testing 
can be named as the main contribution of this monograph. 
The proposed testing models must be verified after their designing. 
The designed testing models were verified against our specified 
requirements for testing, considering the fact that the safety-critical systems 
are a specified area where it is a problem to gain the actual documents. To 
verify them we have suggested a metrics and we have defined its 
parameters. The proposed metrics for verification of the designed testing 
models can be considered as the last contribution of this monograph. 
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 ABBREVIATIONS 
ASIC  Application-specific integrated circuit 
BK  Safety-critical 
E/E/PE  Electrical/ electronic/ programmable electronic 
E/E/PES Electrical/ electronic / programmable electronic system 
EUC  Equipment under Control 
FAT  Factory Acceptance Test 
HW  Hardware 
RS  Control System 
SAT  Site Acceptance Test 
SIL  Safety Integration Level 
SI/SIS  Safety Instrumented System 
SRS  Safety Requirements Specification 
SW  Software  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Newly developing environments, languages, tools and accesses of 
software are continuously being used to develop standard computer 
systems. New points of access do not guarantee that a created system will 
be without failures. The question of final product testing is still critical. 
Testing helps us to uncover errors. Testing of these systems is a relatively 
well studied area with an amount of general as well as specific accesses. 
These are applied and approved in practice while points of access for testing 
of standard systems are concretely defined. 
The importance of testing is higher when we focus on the area of 
safety-critical systems. These require higher consistency in their 
specification and design as well as their testing. Their failure can have 
catastrophic results and can harm health, human lives or the environment. 
A simple unplanned event or event sequence can cause a failure and 
accident. An emphasis on testing of these systems is much greater than with 
standard systems, they require different methods, approaches and strategies 
than in testing of classic systems.  
Safety-critical systems do not have only safety functions, but often 
also functions which do not relate to safety. We have to work with the 
requirements of testing standard as well as safety-critical systems by testing 
of these systems. Requirements of standard systems can be used as a basis 
for the concrete testing process; they must be completed with requirements 
for testing of safety-critical systems. Although testing of these systems is 
very important, requirements for testing are not defined. 
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 Testing is mostly focused on standard systems; however testing of 
safety-critical systems requires a specific approach. Companies operating in 
this area use mostly internal directives orientated on a concrete area and 
specific systems. These internal directives are a part of company know-how 
and it is not possible to get an access to them. Only one available directive 
for testing of these systems is GAMP guideline which deals with safety-
critical systems in the areas of food and pharmaceutical industries. 
However there are no completely defined processes of testing in the 
area of safety-critical systems. Therefore it is necessary to deal with testing 
of these systems. 
 
Definition of problematic area 
 
There are many standards on the development of standard systems 
with accent on the importance of their testing. The most important are the 
standards IEC 12207, IEC TR 15271, IEC TR 16326, IEC 56/575/CD, IEC 
14598, IEC 12119 and DIN 66272. However these are focused on testing of 
standard systems so they do not relate to testing of safety-critical systems. 
The area of testing of safety-critical systems is so important that it is 
required to deal with design and development of these systems. 
Testing of these systems is a very wide area and it cannot be described 
completely in this monograph. For this reason we have focused on specific 
problems of a concrete area, on a communication subsystem and particular 
problems connected with communication. Based on the typical safety-
critical system of a nuclear power plant we can apply our proposed testing 
model in the highlighted area in Fig. 1.  
11 
  
Fig. 1 Monitoring and control system of a nuclear power plant 
 
The previous figure does not need to show clearly our communication 
level. If we had to define it more generally for example in the hierarchy of 
the industrial control system (1) in Fig. 2, it would be on the Control level. 
This specification is important because every level contains specific 
requirements for data communication. Except for them there are various 
time requirements on communication in concrete levels. 
12 
  
Fig. 2 Hierarchy of control industrial system 
 
Because the testing area is also very wide it was necessary to focus on 
concrete tests which can be applied for testing of the communication 
subsystem of safety-critical systems. System testing was selected as a type 
of test which evaluates in a complex way a system behind the limits of its 
specified requirements or system sources. It must be processed on a 
completely integrated system and it must follow after integration testing. It 
is classified as non-functional testing, but it serves for testing of functional 
and non-functional system aspects. Due to the fact that the selected system 
testing tests the system as a complex the communication subsystem is one 
of the tested components. 
13 
 Aims of the monograph 
 
Regarding the specific problems in this area it is necessary to design 
a testing model of these safety-critical systems. We focused on specific 
requirements for testing communication subsystems. It is necessary to know 
specific aspects before the concrete design of a testing model. At first we 
had to define specific requirements for testing from the perspective of 
safety-critical systems. Therefore we have identified and analysed standards 
containing requirements for safety-critical systems which could provide us 
requirements for their testing. We have focused on various standards of 
safety-critical systems. 
Concrete standards and directives for safety-critical systems are not 
clearly connected with a process of design for a particular system and they 
are focused on concrete safety requirements. Based on analysis of standards 
and directives we proposed a simple model of design and development of 
safety-critical systems. We have integrated system testing into the process 
and we have identified specific requirements which must be included. 
Regarding the fact that the system testing includes more specific test 
types, we have decided to create two models of testing with a focus on 
different types of test. We have focused on stress and performance testing. 
Each of these tests presents a different perspective on system testing of 
safety-critical systems. 
The designed testing models were verified after creation to confirm 
their quality. We have decided to propose a metric to verify; the metric 
determines correspondence of design to specified requirements.  
14 
 The concrete aims of this monograph can be summarised into the 
following points: 
1. Defining of differences and specific aspects of requirements on 
testing of safety-critical systems 
2. Integration of system testing into the process of design and 
development of safety-critical systems 
3. Design of performance testing model of communication subsystem 
testing  for safety-critical control systems 
4. Design of model- step stress testing of communication subsystem 
by safety-critical control systems 
5. Design of metrics to verify proposed testing models 
 
15 
 1. THEORY 
 
There are various processes, methods, approaches for design and 
testing used in practice. Our selected system testing verifies 
the functionality of the system as a complex. Therefore they can be 
processed after integration tests (which means in later development phases) 
and they belong to the last test level which is made before submission to a 
customer. The first process step is therefore analysis and specification of the 
concrete properties of the system testing as well as the software as a 
complex. 
From the perspective of software testing it is necessary to define 
important terms from this area. We focus especially on the design, testing 
and implementation into system testing. Because system testing is mostly 
included into each testing process, it is a permanent part of acceptance 
testing whether it is a factory acceptance test or site acceptance test. This 
definition and implementation of system testing is needed to simplify the 
identification of properties of safety-critical systems which must be 
included into the designed model of system testing.  
It is important to also analyse appropriate types of system tests (or its 
more specific variant). Stress, performance and load testing belong to the 
most used aspects in the area of communication testing. This analysis is 
processed for more detailed specification of a completed test, while 
important properties can occur and they must be taken into account by its 
application. 
This chapter provides material for selection of appropriate system 
testing. Requirements and properties will be determined which are a basis 
16 
 for this class of test. Steps of defining the differences between traditional 
and safety-critical systems will be highlighted. 
1.1 Testing of Software 
It is necessary to define some basic terms from the area of software 
testing. Knowing these terms helps to understand properly the process of 
software testing. 
Testing of software consists of a dynamic verification of programme 
functioning on the final group of testing scenarios. This is selected from a 
nearly infinite set of processing domains in regards to a specified expected 
process (2). 
Failure is defined as a deviation of real functionality of SW system 
from the required functionality. This means we are talking about failure 
occurring when the tested programme does not react properly (3). 
A testing scenario is characterised by the initial state of the tested 
object, testing inputs, conditions and expected results. The base of the 
testing scenario by specifically orientated testing is an action sequence 
needed to test certain functionality with a concrete SW. Input data are 
the basis of the testing scenario in implementation orientated testing. These 
data enter a certain code part to be tested (4).  
A test can be defined as a programmed testing scenario which can be 
started in a testing environment. A test is therefore an executable 
presentation of the testing scenario. The test was successful when an 
expected result defined in the testing scenario was identical with a real 
result after initialization and evaluation of results. In the opposite case the 
17 
 test was unsuccessful and we are talking about a failure in running of the 
tested SW (4). 
 
1.1.1 Verification and validation 
 
Verification of software proves if a developed system was correctly 
developed considering its specification. The process of verification 
uncovers failures in the SW system but not their absence or missing of some 
concrete functionality. Verification of the system can be static or 
dynamic (2).  
Static verification is the static control of a proposed specification, 
the control of a programmed source code and others. The technique of static 
analysis is used for these purposes such as for example supervision of 
models, analysis of data flow and supervision of source code (2).  
A dynamic process of a developed system is studied by dynamic 
verification and it is evaluated with regard to the required running of this 
system defined with its specification (5). 
Validation deals with verification of the specification of a developing 
SW system, with consideration of the real expectations and requirements of 
the customer. The basic question in the process of validation is if 
a developing system is the one which we really want and have. Validation 
uncovers a poorly defined or completely missing functionality of system. 
This process is made also with the participation of the customer and 
analysis of user requirements, creation of prototypes and others are applied 
by it (4). 
18 
 1.1.2 Elementary attributes of software quality 
 
To estimate the quality of software systems many various attributes 
can be used. Many of them are considered as a system type – we can apply 
them by a whole system or they can be spanned through more parts of the 
software system. What defines an important set of qualitative attributes 
is dependence on objective perspective (6).  
 
 
Fig. 3 Attributes of software quality 
 
The most applied qualitative attributes are illustrated in Fig. 3. These 
attributes present for example concrete spheres which are an object of 
system testing. The standard ISO 9126 defines various metrics for each of 
these spheres; the metrics can be applied to evaluate particular attributes. 
There is a close link between attributes of software quality and testing (6). 
 
1.2 Acceptance testing 
Acceptance testing is a type of testing processed to verify if a concrete 
product is developed according to standards and specified criteria and if it 
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 follows all requirements of the customer. This testing is one of the types of 
testing with the method of a black box, when the user is not interested in the 
internal functionality/code of the system but he/she evaluates the complete 
functionality of the system and compares it with the user specified 
requirements (7). 
Acceptance testing is also known as validation testing, final testing, 
QA testing, FAT, application testing, etc. In software engineering 
acceptance testing can be processed in two levels: one on the level of 
a system supplier and the second on the level of the final user (also called 
UAT, FAT or testing with a final user (7). 
The output of acceptance testing can be expressed as a success or 
failure on critical operation conditions which the system has to follow 
successfully or not and a final user evaluation of a system (7). 
 
1.2.1 Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) 
 
The main aim of FAT is to test the security of safety-critical systems 
(solving logic with particular software). Tests are processed during the last 
phase of the design before final installation. FAT follows a control 
procedure of safety-critical systems and functions according to the specified 
requirements on safety (8), see Fig. 4. 
FAT contains appropriate general testing processes to verify 
the correct functionality of a safety-critical system. Testing activities are 
general methods. Therefore FAT can be applied in programmable as well as 
non-programmable safety-critical systems. The most important part of FAT 
deals with specification of testing cases; this means clear description of 
20 
 testing cases, well-structured testing processes and relevant cases of 
testing (8). 
 
Fig. 4 Factory Acceptance Testing 
Planning 
Planning presents a set of appropriate tests which must be processed 
and which are responsible for development of testing cases. Appropriate 
levels of competencies and independence of evaluation are required. 
21 
 Concrete test processing should be described as well as the responsibility of 
testers. The testing protocol is created during planning. It is necessary to 
specify who approves a testing protocol (8). 
The process of FAT should be defined and documented with a correct 
way. Every testing process must be described with a logical sequence.  This 
means how to test the application software and hardware. Necessary 
competencies of contributing staff are described during planning. It is 
recommended that staff members with appropriate experience in the process 
and safety-critical system should deal with the planning of FAT. Experience 
creating various spheres, such as for example the process of design, design 
of hardware and software, can contribute to FAT planning with relevant 
testing cases. The content of the FAT tests should be appropriate for 
the planned safety-critical system (8). 
Planning contains processes for repair activities in the case of failure 
during testing. Planning of tests should contain also criteria used to evaluate 
tests. Physical allocation of safety-critical system and functional 
dependence on other systems are questions which must be specified during 
the phase of planning (8). 
To develop integration tests it can be necessary to contact the supplier 
of the solution logic or other relevant suppliers for the used parts in safety-
critical systems (8). 
Testing activities 
FAT is a standard process made with a producer on the place of 
manufacture (development). The producer verifies that the safety-critical 
system is running according to plan. This means it follows requirements 
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 defined in specification of safety requirements (SRS). During the FAT the 
producer verifies if it is possible that (8): 
• Applied equipment is in accordance with specifications 
(compatible HW and version SW) 
• Applied equipment is installed according to the producer 
specification 
• Inputs and outputs are installed according to plan 
• Equipment is correctly calibrated 
• Solving logic and appropriate software works according to the 
requirements in SRS 
• Outputs and their actions follow SRS 
• Resetting of functions work according to the SRS 
• Alarms follow SRS 
• Operator functions follow SRS 
• Bypass functions work according to the SRS 
• Functions for manual switch off work according to the SRS 
• Diagnostic functions of alarm follow SRS 
Outputs of safety-critical functions are observed during various testing 
cases. For example, a simulation of inputs is done to verify that safety-
critical functions fulfil the requirements in SRS. If the FAT uncovers 
weaknesses in a phase of proposal and design, or in a phase of SRS, it is 
necessary to modify these phases according to the results of FAT. To check 
a modification, the safety-critical system must be tested again (8). 
The FAT should be processed in defined versions of the logic of 
solutions and its configuration must be specified to gain relevant testing 
cases. To process the tests it is necessary to describe the required tools and 
23 
 testing environment. Any modification or change should be an object of 
safety analysis to consider its influence spectrum on every safety-critical 
function. It is necessary to define and implement again a range of testing 
(8). 
Test Result  
All testing cases of FAT must be described in documentation and also 
if the aims and criteria of test were fulfilled or not. Discovered failures 
during test and failure causes are documented and supported with necessary 
activities to repair failures (8). 
If the SI system was modified a safety analysis must be processed to 
find out if safety was influenced and if a new testing is required (8). 
 
1.2.2 Site Acceptance Test (SAT) 
 
This variant of acceptance test is usually processed at the operation 
place after installation. The customer can require a successful 
implementation of SAT before the real operation of the system. 
Demonstration that the system and application work properly with specific 
determination places plays an important role (9). 
Testing activity of SAT can be identical or slightly different than the 
FAT activities. Verification of particular testing cases on compliance with 
requirements and criteria has the same role by both acceptance tests. The 
only one change is the place of system testing (9). 
Activities during the SAT are (9): 
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 • Verification of functions which could not be fully evaluated during 
system tests 
• Control of local modifications / repairs 
• Control of support systems 
• Verification of documents / processes 
• Enabling of process acceptance tests on key places with the 
user/developer 
• Demonstration of contract requirements with a part of the product 
or the complete system. 
1.3 System testing 
 
System testing can be defined as a testing phase on the completely 
integrated system to consider the correspondence of the system with 
specified requirements. It is processed in the phase of testing of modules, 
components and integration testing (10). 
A system is a complete set of integrated components which give 
functionality and properties to a product. If we want to test a whole system 
we have to understand the product function as a complex. System testing 
helps to uncover failures which cannot be directly associated to a module or 
a range. System testing shows problems which are at the level of design, 
architecture and code as a whole (10). 
System testing is only one phase of testing which tests functional and 
non-functional aspects of a product.  It is focused on the customer’s use of a 
product and solutions with simulation of customer requirements. From the 
25 
 perspective of the non-functional aspect it brings various types of testing 
(called quality factors). Here are some of them (10): 
• Performance/Load Testing  
Performance testing evaluates the process time or time of system 
feedback, which is needed to precede required functions in 
comparison with various versions of the same product or products 
of different producers. 
• Stability Testing 
Stability testing is used to find maximal abilities of system 
parameters which require an enormous number of sources. 
• Reliability Testing 
Reliability testing serves to evaluate the ability of a system or an 
independent system part. Ability includes a repeated function 
process during a particular time (10). 
• Stress Testing 
Stress testing evaluates a system behind the borders of its specified 
requirements or system resources (as it is a space on disc, memory, 
load of processor) to secure that system will be not abruptly 
damaged (10). 
• Interoperability Testing 
This testing is processed to secure information exchange between 
two or more products, an information application and close 
cooperation (10). 
• Localization Testing 
This testing verifies that a located product works properly in 
different languages (10). 
26 
 The definition of system testing can be modified to cover wider 
aspects on higher levels while it is dependent on the context (10). 
1.3.1 Stress Testing 
 
Stress testing is one of the system tests. Stress testing represents 
testing of software or hardware on its efficiency in concrete conditions or 
sufficient performance under extreme and bad conditions. Stress testing 
helps to determine the level of robustness, reliability and balance or 
satisfactory performance in the system.  This is also tested beyond the limits 
of normal system operation (software and hardware) (11).  
The most important application of stress testing can be found in testing 
of software and hardware which should work also in critical situations. 
Stress testing with particular software is considered as an efficient process 
to determine the limit when the system/software/hardware has the property 
of robustness, it is always ready to fulfil tasks, to manage efficiently the 
load, and it shows an efficient administration of failures in extreme 
conditions (11). 
Stress Testing (Fully Censored Test) 
Standard stress testing is based on fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the 
required aim which presents reliability. The test is designed around 
hypothesis: a product has a given reliability with a given confidence. The 
hypothesis is tested by determination of how many parts must work without 
failure during the defined time by a certain severity. This test type is also 
called fully censored. If the test is successful the process of testing is 
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 finished sooner than some component fails. We do not gain any relevant test 
results (12).  
The precision of stress testing depends on two key factors (12): 
1. Number of tested elements 
2. Number of tested life cycles. 
The greater number of tested elements, the more precise the test is. 
Increasing the number of tested life cycles declines the number of needed 
elements, but it is necessary to implement an estimation of the distribution 
in the amount of tested elements (12). 
A fully censored test is a test of the type pass/fail. Therefore its 
accuracy cannot be defined in a simple way. However the main factors with 
an influence on it are identified according to the (12): 
1. Importance of tests regarding operation conditions 
2. Tolerance for repetition of testing conditions 
Step stress Testing 
Today more methods of accelerated testing are on the first position. 
Stress testing, as a type of accelerated testing of reliability, belongs to the 
accelerated life testing. The main idea of accelerated testing is that materials 
are exposed to higher than usual conditions to avoid early failure. Data 
gained from these experiments must be extrapolated to estimate a lifetime 
distribution under normal conditions (13). 
Step stress testing can be considered as accelerated extension of stress 
testing with an aim to improve some of its aspects. Step stress testing starts 
in same way as a completely fully test. Firm number of elements goes 
through life cycle which is for example 500 h. Load applied on a product 
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 was continuously increased after the first life cycle. The purpose of load is 
to gain a failure of tested elements (12). 
Precision of the step stress test is connected with three key 
factors (12): 
1. Number of tested elements 
2. Number of tested life cycles 
3. Method of load increase 
The first two factors are identical as by the fully censored test. A high value 
of time to failure is declined by a high increase of load. Time needed to 
accumulate failures is very long and differences of particular times to 
failure are very big by a low increase of load.  A rate of damage is increased 
by a growing load, time to failure is lowered and a range between times to 
failure is shorter (12). 
Accuracy of the step stress testing depends on an accuracy of the first 
and the second part of test. Accuracy of the first part is connected with an 
accuracy of fully censored test. Accuracy of the second part depends on 
a method as increased loads (12).  
Repeatability of the step stress test is relatively high while there are 
some limiting factors regarding to a test character (12): 
• Real load distribution of tested elements is not determined 
• Test can last relatively long time 
• Test can be very misleading if an importance of test is not accurate 
regarding to operation conditions 
Time of test duration depends on a length of one life cycle which is 
defined on base of its technical analysis. Test can last few hours or some 
months. Fully censored test usually lasts a shorter time for simple load 
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 conditions and a longer time for more complex load conditions. Step stress 
testing takes in general two times more than a fully censored test which is 
a base for the test (12).  
1.3.2 Performance testing 
 
Performance testing is a type of system testing which determine times 
of different critical company processes and transactions which can be 
compared. Load of system is low during the performance testing but the 
system operates with a database of production size. This method of 
performance testing determines “the best possible” performance in 
a concrete configuration or infrastructure. This test helps to identify 
necessary modifications in testing process which must be made (14).  
In practice there are mostly used performance tests with automation 
tools. They help to minimize influences from perspective of users so they 
can secure a high accuracy of repeated measurements. Advantage is that the 
same testing scripts can be used later by the load testing. Gained results of 
load testing can be compared with original results of performance tests (14). 
A key quality indicator of performance testing can be repeatability. 
Repeating of the same performance test should provide a same set of results 
for identical tests. If results are not always identical then differences 
between concrete performed tests do not relate to changes of application, 
configuration or environment (14). 
30 
 Specific Aspects of Performance Testing  
Performance tests contain some specific steps which must be 
considered by testing. An important step of planning is for example 
a defining of aims before the next process, specific aspects of testing data 
and determination of result evaluation (15). 
It is necessary to define the aim and used metrics before concrete 
testing. These reference values are the base for optimization and selection of 
appropriate testing techniques. Applied criteria should correspond with 
requirements for example a complex intranet application should not be 
given to 10 000 parallel users. Performance requirements should be defined 
in a phase of specification while it is necessary to verify their consistency 
and validity (15). 
The next important theme which is often forgotten is testing data. Ideal 
performance testing of performance should be made on a system operating 
with real data. These data are comparable with a volume of production data. 
In the most cases it is not possible to gain testing data from a production 
system. In these cases a lot of data must be artificially generated (15). 
Real volumes of data are a base for meaningful performance testing. 
Obstacles in performance connected with database can be often recovered 
only with a help of data load (15). 
To correctly evaluate and present test results it is important to know 
data which must be documented. There is no general method for analysis 
and correction of data (15).  
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 1.3.3 Load testing 
 
Load testing is a variant of performance testing. The difference is that 
testing is processed only by a full load. The aim of load tests is the time 
determination of various critical operations and company processes which 
are used to verify expected parameters. They enable also evaluation of 
application possibility by a load and they help to operate correctly with 
documentation of correct, incorrect and failure operations. Regarding 
the test character of a wide input from real operation is needed for an 
accurate simulation of load (it is possible to use also generated data) (16). 
Operations which must be included into testing are an important factor for 
results of load testing. Basic classes of functions or processes which should 
be included into a test are in the Table 1. 
OPERATION GROUPS FROM PERSPECTIVE  
OF LOAD TESTING                                                                           Table 1 
Operation group Description 
Often repeated 
operations 
If they are not sufficiently efficient, they have 
a potential to influence a performance of all 
operations. 
Critical operations They have an influence on basic aims of 
system and their failure by load has the 
strongest influence  on a system performance 
Operation of reading Test should include at least one operation 
processed only for data reading 
Operation of 
modification 
Test should include at least one operations 
processing data modification 
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 The purpose of every load test should be clearly described and 
documented. Mostly we can divide it into one of two categories (16): 
• Determination of risk 
• Determination of minimal configuration 
We estimate a probability by a risk determination that a system 
performance will follow formal performance requirements (for example 
required times of feedback by a certain load). Load testing does not reduce 
a risk directly but with a help of identification and evaluation of risks, 
a proposal of possible modifications and impulses for steps to minimize a 
risk (16). 
We look for a minimal configuration by a determination of it. This will 
enable fulfilment of required formal performance requirements. It is 
especially a minimizing of hardware, software and other costs (16). 
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 2. ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMATICS OF SAFETY-CRITICAL 
SYSTEMS 
 
It is needed to define basic terms before a determination of differences 
and specific aspects between traditional and safety systems. Firstly it is 
needed to define a relation between safety and safety-critical systems. These 
terms are connected together and they are not complete without each other. 
Except of them basic spheres of safety aspects are designed in dependence 
on type of danger. 
Safety-critical systems in understanding of context of our testing 
belong to safety-critical computer systems. While the scheme mentioned in 
this part is kept also by standards for safety-critical systems. Basic 
advantages and disadvantages of application of these computer systems are 
also formulated. 
One of the most specific properties of safety-critical systems is a real 
time which is included in requirements for nearly all safety-critical systems. 
We do not need only to reach correct results but we must also get them in 
a correct time. Except of that there are more types of system resources 
which are used, categories where a system belongs to, types of a real time 
and planning algorithm for deciding. These properties can be included and 
applied in a designed model of testing. 
Because our designed model of testing is orientated on 
a communication subsystem, it is important to focus on industrial networks 
and their safety. There are more types of industrial networks and their 
protocols used for safety of industrial networks. 
Results of this chapter helped us to see better a testing of safety-
critical systems. These contain some identical properties as standard 
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 systems and therefore processes for their testing do not need to differ. They 
must implement requirements for testing of these systems with standards 
and guidelines. Except of that we can better understand aspects which must 
be considered by testing of communication system. 
 
2.1 Safety and safety- critical systems 
 
A term of safety is a very important term of safety-critical systems. 
From the perspective of safety-critical systems it is possible to define safety 
as a property of system which will not threaten human lives or environment. 
The more general definitions define a safety as a situation when risk is 
reduced to an acceptable level. Following this definition there is no absolute 
safety or a zero risk. It is not valid only for safety-critical systems but also 
for all spheres of life (17). 
Based on these definitions of safety we can formulate a term of safety-
critical system. It is a system when its incorrect functionality (failure) can 
have huge consequences as loss of lives, heavy injury, damages on 
environment and others. This definition says that every system can be 
named as safety-critical system when human or environment can be hurt by 
unspecified way (17). 
In dependence on type of danger particular aspects of safety can be 
divided into three spheres (17): 
• Primary safety 
This includes all aspects corresponding with danger from system´s 
hardware. For example a protection of user from electrical shocks, 
a reduction of fire risk (which can be in hardware) (17). 
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 • Functional safety 
It is important by safety-critical systems. It includes an evaluation 
of possible danger sources which can be formed in components of 
controlled systems. While EUC must be in a state to cause 
damages. For example a safety arm of robot can not endanger 
a worker in any case (17). 
• Indirect safety 
Some systems do not represent a danger but they are critically 
relevant. In this case it is needed to consider an indirect safety. For 
example systems of emergency alert which can threat humans by a 
failure (17). 
Although this classification is focused on hardware of safety-critical 
systems (in examples), it can be a safety-relevant (critical) system 
component. Also a simple access to database system can be safety relevant 
with data influencing on safety-critical functions (17). 
 
2.2 Safety Critical Computer Systems 
 
Safety critical computer systems present a connection between 
a controlling computer system and a complete system (17). These parts 
must be integrated together, which is shown in the scheme in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5  Structure of control and safety system 
 
Information on a controlled process or its environment (called as 
EUC) is collected with various sensors. Gained data are analysed with 
concrete software and new orders for EUC are created on their base. These 
are transferred with actuators (17). 
Safety-critical computer systems can be divided into two groups 
according to their function. The first are control systems which serve 
especially to control other system elements. They can be classified as 
safety-critical in a case when a controlled process presents a danger in 
certain conditions. The second group are safety systems which are 
implemented on processes (or systems) which are safety-critical in their 
base. They serve to control other elements of system (process) or its 
environment. In case of data change gained from sensors the system 
signalises this fact on a control place or some measurement is processed 
(17). 
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 Reasons for implementing of computer systems in safety-critical 
applications are similar as reasons by traditional applications. There are for 
example a high performance (for example by data scanning and 
calculations), compactability and flexibility (simple adaptability of 
properties) (17). 
Their disadvantages in this sphere are less obvious. The main problem 
is an enormous complexity of hardware and software while the main aim by 
a design of safety-critical hardware and software is to decline 
the complexity to the lowest possible rate. Software is complex in its base 
and it is not possible to test all cases (17).  
 
2.3 Systems of Real Time 
 
A system of real time is a system with specific aspects including 
logical and time requirements on accuracy. System operates logically 
correctly when we gain correct results. System operates correctly from time 
perspective if we reach results in a correct time. Not only is the 
specification of time requirements important by systems of real time but 
also verifying of time correctness. Systems of real time can be characterised 
as (18): 
• Controlled by events 
• Their failure is expensive and dangerous 
• Parallel/multi-wire programming 
• Permanent operation without operator activity 
• Requirements for reliability and resistance against failures 
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 Systems of real time should have guaranteed time accuracy (feedback) also 
in the case when some events require access to the same system resources.  
System resources can be classified into the following classes 18: 
• Adequate 
Nearly every methodology for system design can be used to fulfil 
time requirements of application (18). 
• Inadequate 
Application has such requirements which are out of limits of 
possible technologies. No methodology can be used to fulfil time 
requirements of application (18). 
• Adequate but rare 
It is possible to fulfil time requirements of application but only 
with using of precise methods of source allocation. From 
perspective of real time the most interesting applications are 
located in this area (18). 
It is important to say that nearly every control system is a system of real 
time. The complexity of the system (number of sensors, action members) 
tells if it has a sense to consider logical as well as time requirements (18). 
Application of systems of real time can be classified as (18): 
• Clearly cyclic 
Every task is started periodically with stable requirements for 
system tools. They are for example a digital regulator, control of 
flight, monitoring in a real time (18). 
• Prevailing cyclic 
The most tasks are started periodically but a system reacts also on 
external asynchronous events. These are for example modern 
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 avionic and control systems (18). 
• Asynchronous and predictable 
Most tasks are not periodic. Requirements for system tools can 
differ during the sequence of initiations but they have known limits 
or static distribution. They are for example a processing of signals 
and observing of objects (18). 
• Asynchronous and non-predictable 
They react prevailing to asynchronous events. Solved tasks have a 
high complexity. Typical examples are intelligent control in a real 
time, simulation in real time and virtual reality (18). 
 
2.3.1 Time limits 
 
To define time limits it is needed to specify two elementary terms: task 
and job. A task is a sequence of code formed by an amount of jobs. These 
are started to support a certain system function. A job represents an instance 
of task. Jobs need resources to be operated. Every job is characterised with 
a set of time parameters, calculations from physical laws describing a 
controlled process (18): 
• Release time 
Time instant when a job is prepared to running 
• Deadline 
Time instant till a job must be accomplished. This time is also 
called as the critical time limit of process. 
• Relative term to deadline 
Interval length between release time and deadline. 
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 • Response time 
It is defined as a difference of a real time of accomplishment and 
a release time. 
Regarding to deadline the systems of real time can be divided into 
(18): 
• Systems with hard real time 
System of real time with strict deadlines. Hard deadlines are such 
deadlines which must be unconditionally followed. If not, 
the system works not correctly and it has often catastrophic 
consequences. They are important tools to verify that terms will be 
kept. Typical examples are a nuclear power plant and a plane 
control (18). 
• System with soft real time 
These are systems of real time including required deadlines. 
Required soft deadline can be sometimes changed. To define the 
word “sometimes,” probabilistic description of requirements can 
be used (for example 99% of terms must be accomplished) or with 
help of function defining describing the usability of batch 
according to the deadline, for example phone centrals and 
multimedia applications (18). 
Except of previous deadlines there is also the first firm deadline. A required 
deadline is such that functionality is close to zero in a moment when 
deadline is reached (delayed batches are not needed) (18). 
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 2.3.2 Scheduling algorithm 
 
Scheduling algorithm for systems of real time can be classified into 
(18): 
• Static  scheduling 
• Dynamic scheduling 
• Scheduling with a static priority 
• Scheduling with dynamic priority 
Decisions are processed only in certain selected time instants by 
a static scheduling (based on hardware timer). Schedule is calculated off-
line and it is stored for using during a programme running. This method is 
possible only when a system is deterministic (18). 
Dynamic scheduling algorithms based on priorities are applied by 
a dynamic scheduling. Every batch is associated with a priority and the 
batch with the highest priority is running. All batches of one task have the 
same priority by the scheduling with a static priority. Various batches of the 
same task can have different priority by the scheduling with a dynamic 
priority. The term of the dynamic priority is based on the method used by an 
implementation of this scheduling (18). 
 
2.4 Industrial Networks and their Safety 
 
Designed model of testing is focused on testing of communication 
subsystem and therefore it is needed to identify elementary problems of 
industrial networks and their safety. These networks are today a part of 
wide measurement and control systems. Communication ways in a control 
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 system are one of important and sensitive spots. Communication safety is in 
standards defined with keeping of (19): 
• Confidentiality (only authorised objects/subjects have access to 
data) 
• integrity (data can be modified only with authorised subjects and 
information origin can be approved)  
• accessibility (data are accessible for authorised subjects into 
certain time, service will not be refused) 
To reach safety aim in communication it is recommended to apply 
safety functions which are processed with suitable selected safety 
mechanism. These mechanisms can have software, hardware, physical or 
administrative form (19). 
In many cases an industrial network is a part of system participating 
on a control of safety-critical processes. Undetectable failure of transferred 
data can cause significant material damage on the equipment environment 
and therefore the system must be designed so that it fulfils a required SIL 
(19). 
 
2.4.1 Types of Attacks in Communication 
 
Attack by communication is a creation of safety incident which uses 
a weak spot of communication system and it causes material damage or 
damage on health. Attack can be in general classified as intentional, 
unintentional or accidental. It is possible to attack hardware components of 
system in general in communication system (natural catastrophes, attacks 
caused by fire, stealing and others), system software (deleting of software 
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 because of a wrong configuration, failure of archive system, operator failure 
and others) or data. From perspective of data these attacks can be divided 
into communication interruption (active attack on availability), monitoring 
(passive attack on confidence), change (active attack on integrity) and value 
adding (active attack on integrity and authenticity) (19). 
Safety- critical communication subsystem used by a control of safety-
critical processes has specific aspects in comparison with standard 
communication system. Basic differences are (19): 
• Processes controlled in a control system of communication 
subsystem are time-dependent 
• Character of data transfer is mostly cyclic 
• Regime of transfer with confirming of data is often used 
• Transfer system must guarantee the determined  SIL of the system 
While a time factor (and therefore also time dependence) of these 
systems depends on a control level and process type. In Fig. 6 there are 
included time factors characteristic for concrete layers (19). 
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Fig. 6 Pyramid architecture of production IS and time factors 
 
From perspective of safety-critical systems it is not important only 
keeping of accuracy and integrity of transferred data but also their time 
accuracy (from perspective of a real time). 
 
2.4.2 Requirements for Safety Protection 
 
To limit a risk connected with danger it is needed that safety-critical 
communication system was in compliance with the standard IEC 61508. It 
has to contain safety protections. During communication the following 
requirements for security must be fulfilled (19): 
• Communication authenticity  
• Communication integrity  
• Delivery of users data 
• Accuracy of data control 
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 Requirements for safety protections must be included into 
a specification of requirements for system and its safety. Library of used 
protections can be little bit modified in a concrete application respecting 
a risk level determined for every type of attack. Determined SIL of concrete 
data and process must be considered, too. Every selected safety protection 
must include a documented proof of safety consisting of its analysis and 
description of safety reaction in case of failure detection (19). 
 
2.4.3 Application protocols 
 
Industrial networks as well as networks in information systems use 
a layer model of communication according to the ISO/OSI. To increase 
a performance and to eliminate delays it was needed to omit extra layers of 
the model ISO/OSI from protocol set. Omitted layers were network, 
transport and relation ones which are not directly required on level of 
industrial bus networks. A link layer has a control of connection in this 
case. Omitted layers decrease the connection control, transfer of extra data 
and packets and a delay is lowered to a minimum (19). 
 
CLASSIFICATION OF PROTOCOLS OF INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS  
                   Table 2 
Layer ISO/OSI Profiles 
Application Application protocols 
(MMS, CAL, CIP, FMS/DP, ...) Presentation 
Relation Higher protocols 
(ISO, TCP/IP, ...) Transport 
Network 
Link Protocols of physical and link layer 
(Fieldbus, industrial Ethernet, TokenBus, ...) Physical 
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 Especially specific company buses and industrial networks labelled as 
Fieldbus networks are applied on the level of physical and link layers (19).   
 
2.4.4 Fieldbus networks 
 
Fieldbus is a term for a group of industrial network protocols used by 
control in a real time. From 1999 it is normalized in the standard IEC 
61158. Term Fieldbus names a digital communication bus between control 
systems and their attached equipment. Fieldbus operates with more 
technology types and their existing protocols and it belongs to one of the 
most used standards in area of industrial networks (19).  
 
TYPES OF ATTACKS AND PROTECTIONS IN NETS                                       
OF FIELDBUS TYPE                                                                          Table 3 
Type of attack Safety protections 
Damage of message 
Accidental repeating of message 
Modification of sequence 
Loss of message 
Non-acceptable delay of 
message 
Inserting of message 
Masking of message 
Wrong addressing of message 
Sequence number 
Time stamp 
Time acceptance 
Authentication of connection 
Response 
Safety code 
Redundancy with cross control 
 
The standard IEC 61784-3 defines more types of attacks on transferred 
reports in industrial networks Fieldbus by a transfer through black 
communication canal (according to the IEC 61508-2). Because of these 
types of attacks and to secure elementary communication requirements for 
safety-critical systems there are exactly defined types of safety protections 
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 in industrial networks of Fieldbus type (based on IEC 61784-3) (19). 
Overview of attack types and particular protections is in the Table 3. 
It is necessary to say that the table does not express correlations 
between types of attacks and their protections (19).  
 
Communication Profile of CIP Safety 
Protocol CIP belongs to the most applied protocols of industrial 
networks especially thanks to the progress of architecture and independence 
from specific products of concrete producers. CIP presents an open object 
protocol supporting a wide scale of communication services not only for 
traditional Fieldbus networks but also for Ethernet networks in industrial 
networks. It can be integrated into various products of concrete producers in 
particular environment. Protocol CIP can be characterised as (19): 
1. It is conceived as an object, every communication node is modelled with 
connected objects. 
2. It provides a wide scale of communication services and it supports 
specific requirements of industrial equipment and control applications. 
3. It uses a single form to transfer all data. 
4. Complete profile set for typical nodes of industrial networks. 
Standard of protocol service CIP can be extended into area of safety-
critical communication with communication profile CIP Safety. This 
extension enables to transfer safety-critical as well as non-critical data in 
one medium and it helps to form safety-critical connection between two or 
more applications (19). 
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 CIP Safety is the protocol CIP with a wider model of application layer 
and user profiles of equipment. Adding of the CIP Safety services to these 
layers increases safety to standard applications from SIL 0 to SIL 3 (19). 
General communication failures for Fieldbus technology were used by 
a design of safety measurements of communication protocol CIP Safety. 
In Table 4 there are definitions of safety measurements which can eliminate 
an effect of expected communication failures (19). 
 
COMMUNICATION FAILURES AND CONCRETE                          
MEASUREMENTS IN THE CIP SAFETY                                       Table 4 
  C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
er
ro
rs
 
Safety measurements 
  Ti
m
e 
 st
am
p 
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
 
of
 se
nd
er
 a
nd
   
re
ce
iv
er
 
Sa
fe
ty
 C
R
C
 
co
de
 
R
ed
un
da
nc
y 
w
ith
 a
 c
ro
ss
 
co
nt
ro
l 
O
th
er
s 
Repeating X     
Lost X     
Input X X    
Change of 
sequence 
X     
Damage   X X  
Delay X     
Connecting of 
SC/SC data 
 X    
Connecting of 
SC/NSC data 
X X X X X 
Errors of 
connection 
X     
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 Although the safety CRC code provides an additional protection for 
communication errors in data, it was not added to errors in the table (19). 
Communication Profile ProfiSafe 
Safety profile ProfiSafe for a bus network Profibus (one of the 
Fieldbus protocols) comes from general requirements for safety-critical 
communication according to the standard IEC 61508. It was designed for 
safety-critical communication between safety-critical peripherals 
and controllers. Most equipment is constructed on a base of computer so the 
profile ProfiSafe was implemented in software (19). 
Safety measurements are one of important parts of the ProfiSafe 
profile. They eliminate errors in black communication channel (according to 
the IEC 61508-2) and other types of general communication errors based on 
the Fieldbus technology (19). Particular safety measurements classified as 
communication errors are in the Table 5. 
 
COMMUNICATION ERRORS AND PARTICULAR  
MEASUREMENTS OF PROFISAFE                                                 Table 5 
Communicatio
n errors 
Safety Measurements 
Sequence 
number 
Time lapse 
with 
confirmation 
Authentication 
of transmitter 
and receiver 
Control of 
data 
integrity 
Repeating X    
Deleting X X   
Inserting X X X  
Change of 
sequence 
X    
Damage    X 
Delay  X   
Masking  X X X 
Errors of 
switchers 
X    
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 Except for these safety measurements, the producer of Profinet 
equipment defines so-called F parameters which are not transferred and they 
are formed during parameterization and configuration of equipment before 
a concrete data transfer. These are for example the address of source and 
target, Watchdog timer monitoring and parameter definition for message 
(19). 
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 3. DEFINITION OF DIFFERENCES AND SPECIFIC ASPECTS 
OF TRADITIONAL SOFTWARE SYSTEMS AND SAFETY-
CRITICAL SYSTEMS 
 
Regarding the fact that the most testing programmes are formulated 
for testing of standard systems, it is necessary to define differences from the 
perspective of testing between traditional and safety-critical systems. There 
is an amount of standards for an area of safety-critical systems as well as the 
standards for standard systems which cannot be described in detail. 
Therefore specific standards for the following analysis were identified on 
the basis of the previous steps. 
We have focused on the standard IEEE 829 which specifies types of 
documents for concrete phases of software testing. The results of analysis 
can be used by our proposal for a testing model regarding the fact that the 
difference between a concrete testing process of standard and safety-critical 
systems is not so big. 
The next norm of our attention is IEC 61508 which presents a base for 
all safety-critical systems. It is standard which must be followed by every 
safety-critical system and requirements on testing must be identical for 
every safety-critical system. 
Requirements from the previous standard for safety-critical systems 
are further described in the next standards and guidelines where 
specification of concrete areas is added. We have focused on the standards 
IEC 50128, IEC 61511, CAP 670, DO-178B, IEC 62061 and the guideline 
MISRA, which present the main standards of concrete areas. These 
standards and guidelines enable a simpler and more efficient 
implementation of safety requirements for concrete areas. 
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 The next group of standards were the standard for nuclear power 
plants. These require the highest level of security and therefore their 
specification of requirements should be on higher and more specified level. 
We have chosen the standards IEC 60880, IEC 61513, IEC 62138, IEC 
60987 and IEC 61226 which represent the standards for area of 
development proposal of safety-critical systems of nuclear power stations. 
Although all analysed standards for safety-critical systems contain 
requirements for testing they are defined in a certain abstract level. 
Therefore we have analysed the guideline GAMP dealing with testing of 
automated systems. This guideline is focused on testing in specific sphere 
(food and pharmaceutical industry) so its requirements for testing are 
appropriate also for safety-critical systems in general.  
Knowledge gained from analysis must be generalized for an 
application in our proposal of model. It is especially because standards and 
guidelines for safety-critical systems deal especially with an integration 
testing. System testing is mentioned only as one test type which must be 
made. Therefore requirements of testing must be generalized so they can be 
applied by any testing type.  
Generalized knowledge from analysis of this standard and guideline 
will present a base for a proposed testing model. They represent 
requirements for testing of safety-critical systems which must be 
implemented with our model. 
 
3.1 Analysis of the Standard IEEE 829 
 
Some documents types were created for a testing control during years. 
The documents are for testing of all types of software, from a testing of 
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 components to a final testing before delivery to customer. Every 
organisation develops these documents individually and with different titles 
which do not fulfil main purpose in some cases. The standard IEEE 829 for 
a documentation of all types of software testing including the user 
acceptance testing has been created to provide a complex set of 
standardized documents IEEE (20). 
The standard IEEE 829 contains eight types of documents which can 
be used in all phases of software testing. This standard covers in general all 
types of testing. It enables to use documents for any situation. 
From perspective of software documentation the complete content of 
this standard is important. Therefore we focus on concrete document types 
by our analysis. 
 
3.1.1 Summary of Results 
 
The studied standard IEEE 829 (20, 21), specifies various types of 
documents which can be used by testing of software. The task of concrete 
documents is clearly specified, requirements and a connection between 
documents are included. Specified documents present various process 
phases of software testing. 
Because they focus on the software testing in general it is possible to 
use it also for documentation of software testing process of safety-critical 
systems. Or in a context of a system testing which we study. Particular 
phases and their documents will present a base for our proposal of testing 
model. 
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 3.2 Analysis of the Standard IEC 61508 
 
The standard IEC 61508 also named as IEC/EN 61508 is focused on 
a functional safety of electrical, electronic and programmable electro-
technical safety-critical systems.  It includes also requirements from the 
American standard ISA-S84.01 from 1996 and the German standard DIN 
19250 from 1994. 
It is named as a basic standard for all safety-critical systems. The 
standard completely covers a safety life cycle, however some requirements 
have more advantages and they can be interpreted better in particular sphere 
standards.  
The standard has seven parts, considering a testing as well as safety-
critical systems the parts 1, 2 and 3 containing requirements for these 
systems are the most important. Requirements are defined for particular 
phases of concrete life cycle. The structure is not modified neither by our 
analysis. 
Other parts deal with instructions and examples of these systems and 
they have an information character from perspective of testing. 
 
3.2.1 Summary of Results 
 
Analysed parts of the standards (22, 23, 24) are focused on a complete 
process of design and development of hardware and software of safety-
critical systems. Safety requirements are defined which must be followed in 
particular phases of safety life cycle. In the case of any safety-critical 
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 system it is needed to respect requirements and recommendations of this 
standard. 
Requirements for testing are focused prevailing on an integration 
testing. Other test types are also mentioned, mostly only as test types which 
must be processed. However, the analysed parts of the standard contain also 
requirements which must be implemented into a process of testing. There 
can be included for example requirements for a development cycle, data, 
data communication, verification, validation and integration tests. 
Because this standard is a base for all standards and guidelines of 
safety-critical systems, it is required to implement gained requirements into 
our proposal of testing model. Identified requirements must be generalized; 
they are not focused directly on system testing. These generalized 
requirements will present elementary requirements which must be followed 
in our model.   
3.3 Analysis of Regional and Product Standards of Safety-critical 
Systems 
 
The analysis of regional and product standards is formed on base of 
specific standards which will cover a significant part of specified safety-
critical systems. We have focused on the main standards which are enlarged 
and completed by requirements of the standard IEC 61508. 
These so called product or regional standards enables a better 
specification of problematic areas of concrete sector.  The following pages 
include brief characteristics of standards together with their commentaries. 
We have focused on the main standards of concrete sectors. 
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 BS EN 50128: Railway Applications – Communication, signalling 
and processing systems. Software for Railway Control and Protection 
Systems  
BS EN 50128 is the European standard which defines technical and 
processing requirements for software development of the PE systems for 
using in a control of railway transport and in protection applications. It 
helps to secure a safety and a correct proposal of control of railway and 
protection software (25). 
They are orientated on a complete process of specification, design, 
implementation and approval of software for railway control and protection 
systems. Except of these they contain requirements for assessment, 
maintenance and security of software quality. They do not forget the 
integration of proposed software with concrete hardware. 
IEC 61511: Functional safety – Safety control systems of 
continuous technological processes 
IEC 61511 is the specific standard focused on final users in 
manufacturing industry. This standard provides the best safety process 
which should be applied by all users by implementation of modern SIS (26). 
It focuses on the system, hardware and software requirements for area 
of technological processes. Except of these it contains also an instruction for 
application of these requirements and defining of required level of 
a complex safety. 
CAP 670: Air Traffic Services Safety Requirements  
CAP670 is the standard which defines a regulation frame and 
requirements connected with providing of air traffic services (27). 
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 This standard describes a method and process of approval by 
a provider of air services. These requirements are focused on fulfilment of 
international agreements and standards to reach a safety of air operation. It 
includes also instructions and methods which can be used to gain an 
agreement with this standard. 
DO-178B: Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification 
The guideline DO-178B deals with a software development of board 
systems in air industry. Its creation is a result of cooperation of more 
organisations dealing with this sphere. The task of this guideline is to 
provide instructions for software production of board equipment. It 
simplifies a certification of this software in area of air industry (28). 
This document reflects on the amount of certification requirements, as 
well as on a recommended process of software approval of board systems. 
Its tasks depends on a method how a software failure can influence a system 
safety. 
IEC 62061: Safety of Machinery – Functional Safety of Safety-
related Electrical, Electronic and Programmable Electronic Control 
Systems 
The standard IEC 62061 defines requirements and it introduces 
recommendation for design, integration and validation of the E/E/PE control 
systems with connection to safety for machinery (29). Content of this 
standard is determined by a structure of the standard IEC 61508 and 
therefore it deals with parallel requirements. These requirements are related 
to levels of safety integrity 1 to 3. 
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 MISRA: Development Guidelines for Vehicle Based Software 
The association MISRA was created as a cooperation between 
producers, suppliers and designers of vehicles for development support of 
safety electronic systems in vehicles and other closed systems. This 
association has issued more guidelines specialised on car industry (30). 
This guideline can be labelled as the main one. Its task is to provide 
a support by a design and a formation of safety software in vehicles. This 
guideline is supported by more reports containing detailed information and 
recommendations for this process. 
 
3.3.1 Summary of Results 
 
Analysed standards and guidelines contain information and 
requirements which simplify their application into concrete spheres of 
safety-critical systems. Guidelines enable a better and more efficient 
implementation of general processes into concrete specific areas in a case of 
proposal of safety-critical systems of a concrete area. 
Analysis of these standards and guidelines was followed to gain an 
overview on specific implementation areas of safety-critical systems.  
Each of these standards and guidelines is specified in different and 
strong specific area. While each has an amount of standards dealing with 
the concrete area into details. To design a testing model on this level it 
would be needed to know specific aspects of a concrete area. Some specific 
knowledge cannot be reached without a detailed specification of concrete 
system. 
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 Therefore the results of analysis will be used by considering of 
specific aspects which must be processed in various phases for example by 
specification of particular safety requirements, identification of testing steps 
and definition of differences. The standards provide also the real areas of 
testing implementation of safety-critical systems. 
 
3.4 Analysis of the Standards for Nuclear Power Equipment 
 
Specific group of industrial and regional standards are the standards 
for nuclear power devices. It means that it is also for computer systems 
which should be implemented in area of nuclear power devices. They 
present one of the highest safety levels with requirements which must be 
followed by particular safety-critical systems. 
It is required to consider the amount of standards by a design, project, 
installing and implementation into a process of safety-critical systems of 
nuclear power devices on a software base (31). 
We have studied the standards which are the most used in this area by 
analysis. We have selected especially standards which are focused on 
a complete system, hardware, software and requirements for particular 
system categories.  
The following pages describe the brief characteristics of the most used 
standards in area of nuclear power devices.  
IEC 60880: Software for Computers in the Safety Systems of 
Nuclear Power Stations 
The standard  IEC 60880 contains requirements for software of safety-
critical systems based on computer used in nuclear power stations with 
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 safety functions of the A category. It focuses on the strictest safety 
functions. It is connected with every phase of software development and 
documentation including a specification of requirements, design, 
implementation, V&V and operation (31). 
IEC 61513: Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and Control 
for Systems important to Safety – General requirements for 
systems 
This standard includes general requirements for measurement and 
regulation systems which are important for safety. It includes requirements 
for a total safety cycle of safety-critical systems, safety life cycle, 
integration and operation of these systems (31). 
IEC 62138: Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and Control 
important for Safety – Software aspects for Computer-based 
Systems performing Category B or C functions 
The standard provides requirements for the software of safety-critical 
systems which are based on computers and they process safety functions of 
the B and C category. It focuses on less strict requirements for safety 
functions. It deals with all aspects of requirements for software of safety-
critical systems (31). 
IEC 60987: Programmed digital computers important for nuclear 
power stations 
This standard deals with computer systems important for safety of 
nuclear power plants. It focuses on hardware of computer systems of the 1st 
and 2nd classes (these are defined in the IEC 61513) in nuclear power 
plants (31). 
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 IEC 61226: Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and Control 
Systems important for Safety - Classification 
This standard defines methods of information classification and 
control functions for nuclear power plants, concrete safety-critical systems 
and equipment. These functions are classified into categories which 
determine an importance of safety functions. It includes criteria for 
classification of safety-critical systems for the A, B and C categories (31). 
 
3.4.1 Summary of Results 
 
Nuclear power facility represents one of safety-critical systems types 
with the highest safety criteria. Regarding to possible risks these 
requirements are more than authorized. 
Specific standards and guidelines (32, 33, 34, 35, 36) for nuclear 
power facilities cover completely all phases needed for specification, design 
and implementation. They include also requirements for particular 
supporting activities as control of modification, categorization, verification 
and others. They define exactly measurements which can prevent some 
risks. 
Analysis of standards and guidelines of nuclear power stations 
provided us requirements for software and data communication, an 
overview of specific processes to secure safety, a relation between 
requirements and concrete steps for their securing and specified verification 
methods and validation of these specific systems. All these requirements 
represent a huge amount of information which cannot be processed in 
the range of the monograph and neither to transfer it into testing model. 
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 Particular phases need an amount of knowledge from specification of 
a concrete system. 
Information gained with this analysis help to achieve closer 
requirement specifications for testing of safety-critical systems in general. 
 
3.5 Analysis of Guideline GAMP 
 
The guideline GAMP presents a recognized instruction for validation 
of automated systems including a testing of software products prevailing in 
area of food and pharmaceutical industry. It does not talk about concrete 
techniques and activities of standard testing but it is focused on 
requirements which must be followed by a testing of safety-critical systems 
(37). 
Analysed guideline GAMP4 consists of four parts: the main part, 
management, development and operation. From perspective of testing the 
guideline D6 has the highest importance in a part of development. It deals 
with the testing process in general and it does not consider specific aspects 
for selected test types. 
 
3.5.1 Summary of Results 
 
Guideline GAMP (37, 38) does not discuss testing in general in 
difference with standards and guidelines for safety-critical systems, but it 
concentrates on concrete steps which must be processed by testing. Testing 
process and concrete testing activities of this standard are very close to the 
testing of standard systems. 
63 
 It deals with the testing in area of food and pharmaceutical industry 
and so requirements for testing can be applied also in general. It can serve 
as a basis for any type of testing of safety-critical systems and also for 
system testing. 
 
3.6 Generalization of requirements for testing of safety-critical 
systems on the basis of analysis of standards and guidelines 
 
Considering an extension of requirements for safety-critical systems 
with analysed standards and guidelines, it is necessary to simplify and 
generalize them for the next classification into a model of system testing. 
Because the system testing is not a known term from perspective of 
standards we have focused especially on requirements relating to a general 
testing or similar test types. 
Because the testing is not proceeded independently it is needed to 
formulate briefly activities which are by all phases and requirements groups 
and which are specified for a system. Every phase in any safety life cycle 
has also supporting activities except of the main activities. These are for 
example modification processing, where all requirements for modifications 
must be controlled and explained, also in case of refusal. The next important 
activity is a documentation which must be processed during the whole life 
cycle. This must contain information important for activities in concrete 
phases, as well as their outputs needed for the next activities and control of 
completing of tasks and requirements. Concrete phases of the safety life 
cycle cannot be considered as independent activities but as a complex set of 
more activity groups which must be processed. 
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 The main groups of requirements are made in the first phases of 
a complete safety life cycle. The first ones are the safety requirements 
which are based on safety functions defined on a base of the previous 
analysis ECU and defined concept. The other requirements are defined after 
classification of safety functions to their E/E/PE systems (also computer 
systems). Every function must have certain requirements of safety integrity 
after classification. The requirements are a base to define SIL. We cannot 
forget the safety requirements relating to the E/E/PE systems. They contain 
requirements for particular subsystems and elements of safety systems as 
well as relations between hardware and software. Therefore also safety 
requirements of software relate to these requirements. They must be defined 
for every safety E/E/PE system because they are necessary for their 
implementation. The important factor for testing is also the architecture of 
software which describes properties and connection of all elements and 
subsystems. 
The ASIC development life cycle is recommended for a design and 
development of safety critical systems. This life cycle is identical with the 
standard development V-model which is recommended with development 
life cycle also for software. This development cycle is recommended also 
by the guideline GAMP. 
A high importance is put on the independence of particular elements 
by the development of safety critical systems. Integration testing is using 
the biggest space in standards and guidelines from perspective of testing. 
Because these tests are processed before system tests, their generalization 
can provide an output for our designed model of system testing. Created 
integration test should contain: 
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 • Testing cases (including of their expected results) and data 
• Testing environment (tools, support software, description of 
configuration) 
• Testing criteria which will be considered 
The integration testing does not use the testing of all input 
combinations (black-box testing) but their reduction with an appropriate 
analysis is recommended. Logical result documentation, fulfilment of aims 
and criteria, documented failures and the following corrections are the most 
important aspects. Attention must be paid to a detailed process description 
of corrections by unsuccessful tests. It is necessary to verify again elements 
or subsystems which were influences by a modification during any other 
corrections. 
Specific corrections are given to configuration data determining 
a system running.  Their parameters must be in an allowed range and 
combinations. Therefore it is needed to secure a data consistency, a validity 
of values and to avoid of an overflow of data source. An important 
requirement from a perspective of system testing is a required determination 
of a maximal load and a time of running. 
To secure data correctness is necessary for a following of 
requirements. Standards and guidelines are focused on both perspectives 
while particular methods cannot be logically divided (for example a division 
of concrete levels of data communication is important because of 
transferred data but also from perspective of transfer in a real time). 
Testing can be considered as a tool used by a design and 
implementation of safety systems, therefore they should follow 
requirements for their support tools. The basic requirement is cooperation 
66 
 (integration) with tools from the previous and following phases. They can 
be classified as software support tools of the T2 category because of their 
general classification. Requirements are in the level of need of their 
specification and documentation. 
Requirements for the testing of safety-critical systems can be 
completed with the requirements for concrete testing steps with an 
application of the GAMP guideline. This guideline deals with a testing in 
food and pharmaceutical industry therefore it can be generalized and used 
by testing of all safety-critical systems.  
Explicitness and documentation of the testing process is emphasized. 
Process of testing must be documented, they must be evaluated and non-
tested components must be explained. Except of this the tests must be 
classified according to the concrete groups and the participating persons 
must be determined. 
Every created test must have concrete input conditions for the testing 
initialization. These are for example the requirements for hardware, 
software configuration, calibration, testing software and testing data. 
Clearly defined requirements are for a structure of testing scenario. 
The testing scenario must be labelled, clearly named and it should contain 
a connection to the tested requirements. Then it has to include the orders for 
test as well as prerequisites and activities after test accomplishment. Also 
acceptance criteria for the test evaluation must be determined. 
Not only test results but also a real testing process must be saved for 
every test. The test must pass or fail. In a case that it failed the test is 
classified as a negative test and the next process must be found. The test can 
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 be repeated, but it can be also excluded from the testing (one or whole test 
group) or it can help to modify a system. 
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 4. DESIGN OF TESTING MODEL OF COMMUNICATION 
SUBSYSTEM BY SAFETY-CRITICAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
 
Design of the system testing model presents the main aim of the 
monograph. It is necessary to define an area of possible implementation of 
designed model before the concrete proposal. If we consider a typical 
safety-critical system, such as the SKR of a nuclear power plant, we can use 
our designed testing model in a highlighted area in Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 7 Part from a system of control and operation of nuclear power plant 
 
A concrete model design does not represent an independent activity 
and therefore it is important to focus on some steps before a concrete model 
design. 
Firstly the meaning of modelling by design and specifications of 
systems or processes had to be defined. Although the modelling is normally 
used by software design of computer systems, its application in other areas 
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 is not very common. Modelling can help to show properties and behaviour 
of nearly every element of real life. The language UML has been applied by 
a design of our model, this language expresses unambiguously a structure 
and running of a modelled system or process. 
System testing is defined as one of the necessary test types in the 
standards and guidelines for safety-critical systems. Its integration into a 
process of design and development of safety-critical systems is still not 
defined. There is no exact description when a system test must be processed 
in which the phase of design of safety-critical system. Therefore it was 
necessary to integrate a system testing into a design and development phase 
before the concrete proposal of system testing model. 
Therefore we have suggested a basic continuity of steps for design and 
development of safety-critical computer systems. These were completed 
with concrete system testing and other specific steps for a better sequencing 
of the proposed process. Based on them we have identified requirements 
and actions in particular steps which are used in the system testing. The 
process of design and development shown in this part integrates not only 
a system testing but it presents also a connection between standard and 
safety-critical systems. 
Because the area of the system testing is very wide it was required to 
specify closer and to select appropriate types of system testing. The selected 
step stress and performance testing was chosen because of advantageous 
properties in connection with analysed requirements of safety-critical 
systems. 
After specification of the previous steps it was possible to design 
a testing model of communication subsystem of safety-critical control 
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 systems. This implements the requirements defined with standards and 
guidelines for testing of safety-critical systems, while emphasis is given to 
requirements of data communication, as well as problematics of real time by 
data communication. The designed model can be considered as a connection 
of the testing process and standards for safety-critical systems. Considering 
a specific area of testing the proposed model operates with a certain rate of 
abstraction and it is focused especially on important steps and states from 
the perspective of standard or safety-critical systems. 
 
4.1 Importance of modelling 
 
Modelling can be defined as the creation of a compact (or smaller) 
system with some identical features with bigger systems. The model plays 
a similar role as the plans by a building construction. The model secures 
before a particular processing that the system follows requirements of final 
users and a design follows required properties. It minimizes complicated 
and financially demanding modifications of the already created system. 
Modelling helps us to work with a certain rate of abstraction. The 
model can hide details which are not important from its perspective but 
from the global perspective it focuses on various aspects (39). The decision 
about what a model reflects has an influence on its understanding or 
solution planning. We talk mostly about the reflecting of a system from 
more perspectives and each can reflect different aspects of the modelled 
system. 
The most used language is UML (Unified Modelling Language) which 
is processed by the group OMG. Although this language is used for 
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 reflecting of a software design, it is possible to use it for reflecting of 
practically any system or process. The language UML shows a static system 
structure as well as various aspects of its dynamic behaviour. Every group is 
defined by some types of diagrams; each of them is focused on representing 
certain properties or behaviour. Regarding its close connection the statically 
reflected properties can be completed with a dynamic behaviour and show 
cooperation of particular system elements. An important aspect is also 
exactness of the UML language. Each diagram and element has exactly 
defined properties. It is possible to understand a method of system 
modelling without analysis or a process reflecting the model. 
We have applied some diagrams of the UML language by our 
designed testing model of communication subsystem of safety-critical 
systems. We tried to use the diagrams which are appropriate for gaining of 
a certain perspective while it is still important to describe the model. It 
provides more exact specification of concrete elements as well as of 
a context of complete diagram. 
 
4.2 Design Process of Safety-critical Systems 
 
Although our designed model is focused on the testing of safety-
critical systems its integration into a process of design and development of 
safety-critical systems is important. A continuity of steps from (40) 
illustrated as the UML diagram of activities in the Fig. 8 is a basis for 
a brief model of process of design and development. This represents an 
approximate time continuity of particular basic steps by a real design of 
safety-critical computer system.  
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Fig. 8  Basic steps of design and development of safety-critical systems 
 
Particular activities of this diagram can be divided into two parts.  
Steps illustrated on the left show a design of standard computer system for 
control of required process (or in general EUC) without safety functions. 
The following steps (shown on the right) are needed to secure a system 
safety which was proposed in the previous step. This activity continuity 
presents a connection between a design of standard and safety-critical 
systems. 
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 4.2.1 System Testing in the Process of Design and Development                      
of Safety-critical Systems 
 
Based on the previous steps of design and development the proposed 
UML activity diagram was modified and it is shown in Fig. 9. This is based 
on the previous diagram and it is completed with a concrete system testing 
and two steps which come from the standards and guidelines of safety-
critical systems. 
The design is shown as a direct continuity of steps; it is necessary to 
verify and validate every step. Considering requirements of safety-critical 
systems it was needed to think also about a correct processing of changes, 
documentation, planning and other in concrete steps. Therefore it is a very 
interactive process demonstrated with a certain degree of abstraction. The 
main reason was complicated illustrations of required support activities for 
each activity which are not significant from the perspective of integration of 
system testing into the process of design and development. 
Design of a safety-critical system starts with functional and operating 
requirements on a computer system. These requirements define what the 
system should do and what method is used for their operation. Only normal 
system operation is considered and it means that any requirements are not 
included into safety. 
The basic computer system is designed and created in the next steps 
according to the previous requirements. This is also focused on a normal 
system operation without implementation of any safety requirements or 
functions. 
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Fig. 9  Integration of system testing into a process of design                                  
and development 
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 Design of the standard system must be completed with safety 
properties and function in the next steps. We have to define a basic 
computer safety system. It is focused on a possible danger (mostly 
concentrated around a control process) which is a consequence of one or 
more risks. In the next step possible risks and their consequences are 
identified. Failure modes are determined on the basis of this identification, 
where the system or concrete components can occur. This identification is 
concentrated on hardware, software and systematic failures.  
Based on the analysis of identified risks and failure modes the safety 
requirements for proposed safety-critical computer system are determined. 
We have to choose between one of two basic architectures from the 
perspective of a control system. The system is transferred into a non-
operating state by an application of the fail-safe architecture therefore there 
is no risk in case of failure occurring. This system must be able to identify 
errors and failures or to change the configuration into a safe (non-operating) 
state. By the application of fail-operate architecture the system must also 
identify errors and failures; however, it must to continue in operation in 
case they occur. Concrete component must be isolated by failure and the 
configuration must be back into an operating state. 
The main priority is elimination of all dangers with the design 
modification by a proposal of any safety-critical system. This modified 
design can be considered as a design of safety-critical system. In the case 
that it is not possible to eliminate all dangerous aspects with a design 
modification the next variant is a modification of architecture of basic 
system. We focus on a reduction of danger connected with a rest risk.  
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 It is important to evaluate a designed architecture after specification of 
the design and architecture of safety-critical system. This step must be 
processed for each concretely designed architecture (not only from 
perspective of process) if it is considered as suitable after analysis and 
testing. 
After a finding of an appropriate architecture the system testing of the 
designed system can be processed and it must be done with a completely 
integrated system. Requirements for testing of a standard computer systems 
as well as safety-critical computer systems must be considered by the 
testing. 
4.2.2 Requirements of System Testing from Perspective of Safety-                     
-critical Systems 
 
It is important to connect particular specific requirements and 
properties of these systems to integrate system testing into the process of 
design and development of safety-critical systems. Requirements and 
specific steps needed for processing of concrete activity were identified for 
concrete steps of process of design and development (shown in Fig. 8). 
Specific steps were displayed as the UML diagrams of application 
however they were reflected as a unit with the UML interaction diagrams 
for better illustration and similarity with the previous process. We have 
focused on a static representation of process of design and development. 
Therefore this diagram is divided into two parts. The first part (in Fig. 10) 
reflects a specification of functional and operation requirements, a design of 
basic computer system and identification and risk analysis. 
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Fig. 10  Requirements of particular steps of design of safety-critical 
computer systems – Part 1 
The first step in a design of safety-critical system is specification of 
functional and operation requirements containing requirements for software 
as well as hardware. Requirements for a concrete controlled process (or 
EUC) must be considered, they can present outputs for containing 
requirements. The software requirements must include also concrete tasks 
processed by software and which are responsible for various parts of 
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software function. Distribution from the perspective of running in a real 
time must be considered, too. Except of definition of particular system tasks 
the identification of concrete states or system modes is a very important 
step. These are important from perspective of the next design and testing of 
safety-critical systems. 
Because our design of testing is focused on software testing the 
existing hardware is considered also in the next step. The basic computer 
system will therefore represent a software program implementing previous 
requirements. Particular software programme must come from its design 
which follows hardware and software requirements. Concrete requirements 
and specifications must be considered. 
All possible risks and their consequences must be identified after the 
phases which are equivalent with a design of standard systems. We go from 
functional and operation requirements as well as specification of software 
and hardware design by the identification. It is important to consider also 
specific aspects of the designed software programme. Based on these 
requirements and specific aspects the concrete failure modes of system and 
its hardware and software components are identified. 
Based on the analysis of these failure modes we can specify safety 
requirements for a proposed safety-critical computer system. These 
requirements will not be specified into details considering the testing of 
safety-critical systems. In general we can include here all basic 
requirements for safety-critical systems by standards and guidelines. 
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Fig. 11 Requirements of concrete steps of design of safety-critical computer 
systems - Part 2 
The second part of the diagram (in Fig. 11) reflects the requirements 
and specific aspects of an architecture design of safety-critical computer 
system, an approval of its design and a concrete system testing. 
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The design of architecture must be based on specifications of safety 
requirements and identified failure modes. From the perspective of 
a controlled process the architecture of fail-safe or fail-operate types must 
be used. Except for these, some standard architectures of concrete computer 
system can be applied in a practice (for example simplex architecture, 
simplex architecture with backup, dual architecture with two active 
channels, triplex architecture ...). 
Selected architecture influences the design of a concrete safety-critical 
computer system. This design must be evaluated and its convenience for 
planned application must be considered.  In this step we have focused more 
on a concrete design of this system because an area of design evaluation is 
very specific. There are more methods which can be applied. Particular 
design of safety-critical computer system must be based on a proposal of 
basic computer system and it must implement safety requirements. The 
selected architecture and identified failure modes must be considered. 
The processing of a system testing must be done after an evaluation of 
safety-critical computer system. An integration test must be done before it, 
which will secure that particular parts work correctly. The system testing 
proves if an integrated system works correctly as a whole. A concrete 
testing process must implement requirements for a testing of particular 
safety-critical systems. A specification of tests is based on: 
• Functional and operational requirements
They are important from the perspective of activities and
functionalities, a concrete system can operate or provide them and
decide which can and had to be tested. They include the
requirements for hardware as well as software.
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 • Requirements for tested process 
It does not need to be directly a process, but also one or more 
“controlled” computer systems in a context of standards and 
guidelines of safety-critical systems. 
• Safety requirements 
They define the limits of functional and operational requirements 
as well as specific aspects for gaining of required safety EUC. Not 
all system functions must be safety-critical therefore it is necessary 
to consider both types of requirements (standard and safety ones). 
The design specification of concrete safety-critical system must be 
studied, too. The system provides certain requirements or restrictions 
considering selected system testing which is not included in the previous 
requirements. Particular failure modes and states of the tested system must 
be known by a system testing. 
A concrete system testing covers a wide test spectrum. Each of these 
tests has certain specific aspects which are used by the testing. The previous 
identification presents a summary of the main requirements which must be 
applied by the system testing of safety-critical systems. 
 
4.3 Specification of the System Testing Type 
 
The system testing covers a wide area so it is not possible to generalize 
the process of system testing. We would have to focus on the main activities 
with a loss of specific aspects of the safety-critical system testing. Therefore 
it was needed to select concrete test types which are appropriate for the 
testing of communication subsystem as well as the testing of safety-critical 
systems in general. 
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 Some types of the system testing are not suitable directly for an area of 
safety-critical systems or the specific requirements and data are needed to 
know for an implementation. Although these tests must be also processed, 
their specification and analysis of particular problematic areas cannot be 
described in one monograph. We have decided for two test types from all 
tests offered with the system testing. Each of them has a different 
perspective on the testing of safety-critical systems. 
The first type is the performance testing which is focused on testing 
performance by a low load. More variants of the performance testing are 
directly specialised on the testing of data communication and a whole 
system. Our designed model was focused on the performance testing in 
general and we did not limit on a concrete variant (for example the testing 
of network sensitivity). It is because they work on the same principle as our 
designed model of the performance testing, however they require knowing 
specific data on a tested system. This condition cannot be fulfilled 
considering our perspective level on the process testing of safety-critical 
systems. 
The second type is the stress testing which focused on determination 
of substantiality and reliability of the system behind the limits of normal 
operation. The stress testing could be considered for a testing concept with 
steps which can be done with other test types. Particular loads and their 
range by a test process can present the input parameters of other tests which 
are a concrete load. 
The main problem of classic stress testing is that we do not need to 
gain any relevant results after a successful test running. Therefore we have 
decided to apply the stress testing for our designed model which is an 
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 alternative variant of the classic stress test. Its main advantage is guaranteed 
achievement of test results. 
 
4.4 Outputs for a Model Design of System Testing 
 
The six basic steps of the automation testing present a base of 
suggested models for system testing. These are illustrated in the Fig. 12, 
while they reflect the automated software testing in the phase of regressive 
testing. 
 
Fig. 12  Six steps of automated software testing 
They do not represent an iterative process of automated testing but 
also an iterative continuity of particular steps in general. The regressive 
testing is focused on identification of failures by modifications of the 
programme code in the system; therefore these steps are similar to the 
system testing.  
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 The step of failure repairs can evoke repair of the created failures (for 
example by the stress testing), but it can be a modification of the tested 
system or its setting. The testing process of our designed models is 
proposed on the base of these iterative steps.  
Other output for our designed models was the standard IEEE 829 for 
a software testing. This standard defines eight types of documents which 
include all phases of software testing from the test planning via its 
processing to its evaluation. Each type of document/script identifies 
concretely requirements and steps which must be followed in a concrete 
phase. It is possible to use them for any test type and therefore it is suitable 
for our proposed step stress and performance testing. It enables also 
completion and modification of concrete scripts used in some steps of 
design. 
The total design of testing model is focused especially on steps 
running with a concrete test. The previous identification and analysis the 
same as the following modification activities are not displayed in our 
models. These phases are specific for a concrete testing system while some 
parameters must be defined for a concrete testing system based on the 
previous experience. If this area is completed with requirements of safety-
critical systems, these phases become more demanding. Therefore these 
activities are only described. 
Because the testing is specialised on safety-critical systems, it was 
necessary to add specific requirements into the testing process. A concrete 
testing process displayed in the designed models was completed with 
specified requirements on testing of safety-critical systems. These were 
gained with a previous analysis of standards and guidelines. We concentrate 
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 on a communication subsystem of safety-critical control systems; it was 
necessary to consider the specific aspects and requirements of data 
communication in these systems. 
 
4.5 A Model Design of the Performance Testing of a Communication 
Subsystem 
 
The first model design of system testing is specified into the 
performance testing. This test type is (together with the load testing) one of 
the most used tests for system testing from perspective of data 
communication. There are more concrete variants of the performance 
testing (for example the testing of network sensitivity) which are focused on 
certain attributes of data communication. 
Our designed model deals with the performance testing in general and 
we have used the appropriate UML diagrams for its display. These show the 
performance testing of communication subsystem of safety-critical control 
system from various perspectives. 
4.5.1 Process of the Performance Testing of Communication Subsystem 
of Safety-critical Control Systems 
 
The first part of the designed model of performance testing is 
identification of particular steps and a proposal of their continuity by the 
testing. Particular steps of the performance testing for traditional systems 
were associated to concrete phases of the standard IEE 829. So we have 
reached an overview about the performance testing sequence for standard 
systems. 
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 Testing of safety-critical systems does differ from the traditional 
systems and it has specific requirements for testing. These were identified 
by the standard and guidelines analysis and then they were generalized. 
Every requirement was associated to a concrete phase according to the 
standard IEEE 829 and the actions which must be processed are identified. 
These actions were implemented into steps of the performance testing for 
standard systems.   
The final model of performance testing for safety-critical systems is 
displayed as the sequence UML diagram in Fig. 13. This diagram shows 
steps of the performance testing from perspective of time.  
Regarding the number of activities the concrete specific steps were 
shown in concrete partial diagrams. For greater transparency 
TestSummaryReport and TestIncidentReport from the standard IEEE 829 
were merged into the phase TestExecution in this diagram. 
Various activities not shown in this model must be made before the 
proposed performance testing. These are for example the steps required in 
a concrete test plan.  
It is for example identification and explanation of non-tested system 
parts or person list contributing on testing from perspective of the testing of 
safety-critical systems. 
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Fig. 13  Design of the performance testing steps for safety-critical systems 
 
The first step of design is a system specification and forming of the 
performance model. The performance model represents various 
functionalities provided by tested system and a using rate. This model is 
a base for functionality that can be applied by the system testing. Degree 
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 and details of reached system specification is therefore very important and it 
has to include the standard as well as the safety system aspects, while, for 
example, allowed ranges and complex inputs have to be considered because 
these processes are very wide and complex, these steps were reflected with 
a certain abstraction. 
The next step is analysis of the system which will be tested. The 
analysis results must be documented for the next using. The gained data are 
important for a testing process which could be labelled as testing data in 
a testing context of the safety-critical systems. Important data for a test 
process were documented as separate steps.  A defined identifier of the 
testing case must be generated before a concrete specification of data.   
The testing aims are the first important information which tells what 
focus on by testing and what is the evaluation of gained results. We can use 
the estimations on the basis of specification, previous experience or the past 
iterations of test. We should know also how to specify requires support 
tools or support software needed by testing. 
Then the load must be determined which will be used by testing, the 
performance testing is concentrated on process times and transactions by 
a low load. The testing must proceed by common loading of the system in 
a normal operation. We can make more measurements at once by the load 
with parallel load test (for example simulation of failure state). It is 
important not to overstep a maximal system load which is specified in its 
safety requirements. 
The last important steps are a reduction of input combinations for test 
(based on analysis and safety requirements) and a determination of 
conditions of test accomplishment. 
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 Then a testing cycle starts. In this part concrete sessions are formed 
which are made according to the rate of functionality use. In concrete 
sessions there are formed the testing scripts which represent various user 
activities including possible alternatives. 
Injectors are added to the concrete session in the next step, their 
number depends on a required load. It is not a total system load but a load 
from the perspective of performance test. Every created injector must read 
the real (production) data which are used by simulation operation with a 
system. In the case that these data are not available or sufficient, it is 
possible to use also generated data (which must follow the specific aspects). 
Later all injectors of an actual session are started and all relevant 
information needed to a test creation must be documented. This step is 
documented with a certain rate of abstraction and it will be described into 
details in a separate diagram. 
If one relation is accomplished and the conditions for test finishing are 
not fulfilled, the next relation is formed and the whole previous process is 
repeated. If the condition is fulfilled, the testing is finished and the system 
must get into an original state. This state is renewed on base of system 
analysis before a concrete test. It can be a restart of the system, change of its 
mode, a change of configuration parameters or an accomplishment of 
parallel load test. 
The results of concrete relations are analysed and evaluated to provide 
relevant results considering the defined aims. Provided results should be in 
a form which is not suitable for the next processing or in a format 
appropriate for the next support tool. Considering specific requirements of 
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 safety-critical systems for this phase, the concrete steps were closer 
specified in an independent diagram. 
Evaluation Phase of the Performance Test 
A big emphasis is given to the test evaluation from perspective of 
safety-critical systems. The important steps for an evaluation of concrete 
relations were illustrated in sequence UML diagram shown in the Fig. 14. 
 
Fig. 14  Evaluation of Relations of the Performance Testing 
Concrete evaluation of tests and the next analysis must be documented 
not only from data of an actual relation but also a real testing process. This 
requirement is emphasized not only in standards of safety-critical systems 
but also in the GAMP guideline. 
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 Because our designed testing model is focused on a communication 
subsystem it is needed to document data necessary for testing of data 
communication. 
In the case that the test fails all identifies errors must be documented 
into one or more reports on an incident. Considering the complexity of this 
process the designed model operates with only one report about an incident. 
Reports on incidents should be formed and modified on base of test 
requirements. It can be a classification based on a subsystem base, failure 
types, categorisation from perspective of the GAMP and others.  
The evaluation of relation results is problematic in specific cases 
during its process. If we cannot determine if the test passed or failed, the 
test is labelled as a conflict one and this situation is documented in the 
report on incident. Such test must be considered by the final evaluation. 
We have to say that this model displays only the main requirements 
for test evaluation from perspective of safety-critical systems. It focuses 
therefore more on specific support activities than a concrete evaluation 
process. Considering the specification of tested systems and a big range of 
possible functionalities, it is not possible to document this process into 
details. 
Phase of Results Analysis of the Performance Test 
The next important step is the results analysis of concrete tests. This 
process was completed with specific steps for testing of the safety-critical 
systems and illustrated as a sequence UML diagram in Fig. 15. 
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Fig. 15  Result Analysis of the Performance Testing 
 
In compliance with specified requirements of the safety-critical 
systems, each test must pass or fail. Therefore all conflicts must be 
considered which were created during the process of test evaluation. 
Because particular data specific for the testing of data communication 
cannot be evaluated in all cases with a simple method, they do not need to 
be the conflicts in a real meaning. Analysis and conflicts evaluation can 
present also the evaluation of information gained by a running of concrete 
relations of the performance test. 
In the case that some test failed by the consideration, it is important to 
define the next process. This test can be again repeated, a system can be 
modified (with tools for a control of changes), or the test (or test group) is 
excluded. 
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 The same as a previous partial model, this one is also focused on the 
specific support activities (from perspective of the safety-critical systems) 
as well as a concrete process of evaluation. 
Test States from Perspective of the Safety-critical Systems 
The concept of test evaluation from the perspective of standards and 
guidelines for these systems is briefly illustrated as the state UML diagram 
in Fig. 16. 
The diagrams demonstrate concrete states where the test can occur 
from perspective of evaluation. The tests must be considered immediately 
after processing and their state is changed on the base of results of this 
evaluation. Although the evaluation criteria should be clearly defined, the 
standards and guidelines for safety-critical systems consider the alternative 
that the test cannot be evidently approved. This alternative can occur if the 
parameters for a verification of information and time correctness of data 
communication cannot be defined but clearly considered. In this case we 
have to analyse gained information after a processing of all relations. At the 
end of some time period (for example after testing accomplishment, at the 
end of work shift, etc.) all conflicts must be considered and logically 
classified (ambiguous tests). 
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Fig. 16  Test states from a perspective of standards and guidelines 
From perspective of our designed model of testing we could identify 
many states where the test occurs during the process testing. This diagram 
reflects only the test states which are important considering the standards 
and guidelines for safety-critical systems. 
4.5.2 Overview of Performance Testing States of Communication 
Subsystems of Safety-critical Control Systems 
 
The next view on our designed model of performance testing is 
an overview of concrete states of performance testing. This overview is 
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 displayed as the state UML diagram in Fig. 17 defining states and events 
which activate transfers between particular states. 
The set of states in this diagram is illustrated as a synchronous 
sequence considering the complexity and a weak illustration of 
asynchronous model. The designed model reflects the testing with a certain 
rate of abstraction, while it illustrates and describes only specific actions 
and activities of particular states. It means those which are important for the 
performance testing process or the testing of safety-critical systems. 
The group of previous standard states (according to the standard IEEE 
829) is displayed as an original state called PreviousStandardStates. This 
complex state is the first one in our designed testing process. After the 
gaining of performance model the event GainedPerformanceModel will 
follow which moves the testing process to a state 
ProblemDomainSpecification. Definition of the use rate for every possible 
functionality is the task of input action. In this state it is also necessary to 
specify all data which are important for a testing process. The specification 
presents an output action of this state. 
The testing process moves to the state SessionCreation by the event 
TestCondition which is a condition for a test accomplishment. Its input 
condition has the task to generate unique testing scripts for an actual 
iteration which will be operated by one or more injectors. Verification of 
this testing script is an output action.  After verification the process testing 
will be moved to the state InjectorsCreation. 
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Fig. 17  Overview of performance testing states for safety-critical systems 
 
The test scripts which were formed in a previous state are loaded after 
gaining of this state. Then real (production) testing data are loaded and they 
represent various actions of injectors. Except of these the synthetic testing 
data can be generated and they can add randomness into a testing process. 
Assigning of injector to an actual relation is the output action by a release of 
this state. 
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 The process is moved to the state SessionExecution by the event 
AddedInjectorToSession if the required load is gained (from perspective of 
performance test). This load differs from an actual load of a whole system. 
If an actual load of performance testing is smaller than it is required by the 
test, the new injector is formed. Our designed model is shown as 
a synchronous continuity; particular injectors in this diagram are formed 
one after another. 
After gaining of the state SessionExecution the testing scripts of actual 
relation are loaded. The main task of this state is a starting of injectors 
created in an actual session. Saving of data and a real process of particular 
session is also needed. If there are errors by a running of concrete injectors, 
we have to create one or more reports on incidents. This process has 
a certain rate of abstraction as a previous look. In this state we have to 
record responses on concrete actions and their times which are needed from 
a perspective of testing of communication subsystem. The task of output 
action after leaving of this state is an evaluation of results of an actual 
relation. Therefore we have to process concrete internal activities. These 
present requirements of the standards and guidelines for safety-critical 
systems. 
If a condition for test accomplishment is not fulfilled by a leaving of 
this state and the test is not interrupted then a new relation is created. In 
another case the process comes to the state TestSummary. Reports on 
performance from all previous iterations are loaded by a process of input 
action. An important task of this state is also an analysis of all data and 
evaluation of all conflicts which were formed during processing of concrete 
sessions. In this case it must be defined if the test passed or failed in 
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 difference to a previous evaluation. This action presents one of the basic 
requirements for testing of safety-critical systems. The report on test is 
formed by a leaving of this state considering the test aims. This test report 
should be in a format which is suitable for the next processing or in a format 
of required following support tool. 
4.6 Design of Stress Testing Model by Testing of the Communication 
Subsystem 
 
The second model design of system testing is focused on the stress 
testing. Considering the certain disadvantages of the standard stress testing 
we have focused on a using of one from accelerated methods. Applied step 
stress testing is based on the original stress test, but it improves some of its 
properties (for example guaranteed result gaining). 
Its process is identical as by an original stress test but it is completed 
with an extra life cycle. The stress values are increased in 10% of every 
10% of life cycle. This process is repeated till 50% of tested parts failed. 
These conditions are applied into our designed testing model and they 
present conditions of a test accomplishment. Therefore this condition does 
not need to be defined when the complete testing is specified. 
4.6.1 Modified Phases of Step Stress Testing 
 
The first step by our design of stress testing model was a proposal of 
basic steps of the step stress test. This design was displayed as the UML 
diagram of activities with a certain rate of abstraction in Fig. 18. 
This diagram reflects an initialization and concrete iterations of the 
step stress test while it shows simple as well as complex activities. The 
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 testing process is accomplished when more than 50% of all elements failed 
during all iterations (except of an introduction fully censored test). The 
second possibility of accomplishment is in the case when one of the tested 
elements failed in a fully censored test. 
 
Fig. 18  Design of modified phases of the step stress testing 
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 In the proposed diagram we have shown the complex steps which 
identify important and specific steps for a proposed process of the step 
stress testing. Particular basic steps of the step stress testing present outputs 
for the next perspectives on a total process of testing. By a closer look at the 
next models it is possible to see a concept based on this diagram. 
It must be said that this diagram reflects only steps of the step stress 
testing for standard systems. It does not include our specified requirements 
for testing of safety-critical systems. These were implemented to other 
perspectives on the proposed model of the step stress testing. 
4.6.2 Process of the Step Stress Testing of a Communication Subsystem 
of Safety-critical Control Systems 
 
The next step was an illustration of time continuity by the step stress 
testing. Concrete steps were attributed to the phases of the standard IEEE 
829. So we have gained the process of steps of the step stress testing in 
concrete phases for standard systems. 
Specific aspects of the testing of these systems were implemented for 
a use in area of testing of safety-critical systems. These were reached by 
analysis of the standards and guidelines for safety-critical systems. 
Requirements for testing of these specified systems were identified. 
Their implementation was processed by the step stress testing for area 
of safety-critical control systems. It was modelled as the sequence UML 
diagram, displayed in Fig. 19. 
Considering a number of activities some steps were more specifically 
documented in an independent partial diagram. This method can identify in 
more simple way the differences between particular types of designed 
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 system tests. Except of that we have joined the phases TestIncidentReport 
and TestRecord into the phase TestExecution. 
The first phase of the TestPlan describes the process of testing and it 
operates all activities connected with testing. Many steps must be made 
before the concrete designed testing process and these steps define and 
specify various data for testing process. From the perspective of safety-
critical systems it is needed to identify and explain all non-tested 
components and save a list of persons contributing by the testing. 
The first step which must be processed in a designed model is 
a gaining of all needed information for testing process. In this phase the 
basic requirement is a preparation of tested system which must be 
sufficiently described for using in the next steps. The steps are described in 
details after their accomplishment; it tells how a concrete testing will be 
performed. Test script which is created on its base must be perfectly 
identified. On the base of this information we can specify required support 
tools and support software tools which will be required by a concrete 
testing.  
Then concrete load parameters must be defined, which must be 
approved because of tested system and their number must be reduced based 
on an analysis. The length of life cycle must be also specified and the 
expected results must be determined. We have to focus not only on the 
whole test but also on its concrete iterations. 
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Fig. 19 Design of steps of the step stress testing for safety-critical systems 
 
The following testing process start to make concrete testing cycles. 
The first iteration is fully censored test (it means the standard stress test), 
when values of the stress parameters adjusted to output values. The next 
step is a generating of test script and its process. It is important to record 
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 data from an actual iteration. These steps are specific and they were 
displayed in a diagram. Particular results of an actual iteration were 
evaluated after finishing. In case of failure of system part it is needed to 
analyze all reports on incidents and the actual iteration can be evaluated. 
We have to consider the aspects of data communication. 
Considering a character of completely fully censored test there should 
be no failures in its first iteration. If there is failure the whole process is 
interrupted and the testing process continues with a complete test 
evaluation. 
Other iterations of the step stress testing are running in identical way. 
They differ in the length of life cycle which is reduced to 10% of the length 
of original completely fully test. If there are errors in testing system the 
parts with failure must be repaired. We follow the record of concrete 
incidents. Process of repair as well as corrections must be documented for 
a total test assignment. 
The testing system interrupts the testing process when more than 50% 
of tested parts fail in all iterations. At the end all results must be evaluated 
and summarized. The next process has to be determined according to the 
test results. The whole test can be again repeated, there can be 
a modification of concrete system elements (with tools for control of 
changes), or an actual test can be excluded (or group of tests). Results from 
this phase should be in a form which is standardized or suitable for the next 
support tools 
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 Process Phase of the Step Stress Test 
Standards and guidelines for safety-critical systems have specific 
requirements for processing and documentation of data from the testing 
process. Therefore the steps which must be displayed in a partial sequence 
UML diagram in Fig. 20. 
During the test the data must be documented as well as a real process 
of an actual iteration. In case there are the errors during the test, they have 
to be described in one or more reports on incident. Considering various 
methods of data creation on incident, this process is generalized. It operates 
only with one report on incident. 
 
Fig. 20  Detailed phase of the step stress test 
 
Step stress testing (as well as stress testing in general) can use other 
types of system tests for concrete specific loads of system (stress). These 
must be selected properly to gain required values.  Concrete test process can 
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 present a starting of system test group which initiate particular specific 
system loads. The evaluation is made from a perspective of step stress test. 
The tests processing a specific system load provide and collect data for this 
evaluation. 
Our suggested model of step stress testing focuses on a testing of 
communication subsystem of safety-critical systems. Recorded data should 
contain also data needed for an evaluation of testing from perspective of 
communication subsystem. This information must be evaluated by tests 
processing particular specific load considering the concept of step stress test 
defined in the previous paragraph. 
A conflict can occur when we cannot tell if the test passed or failed 
from perspective of safety-critical systems. Considering the character of 
step stress testing we should logically know if the system element failed or 
passed. 
We have focused on concrete actions by the specific steps in these 
phases following requirements for testing of these systems as well as 
a concrete evaluation. Specification of evaluation method of step stress test 
of communication subsystem is much less concrete than by the performance 
testing. Therefore we would have to follow important steps when we had to 
study a concrete tested system. 
4.6.3 State Overview of the Stress Testing of the Communication 
Subsystem of Safety-critical Control Systems 
 
The next step was to identify states where the step stress test can occur 
in the designed model of step stress testing. While we identified also events 
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 which activate concrete transfers. This overview of state and particular 
actions was displayed as the state UML diagram in Fig. 21.  
 
Fig. 21 Overview of states of the step stress testing for safety-critical 
systems 
 
Set of states was illustrated as a synchronous sequence from a reason 
of better explicitness and illustration comparing to an asynchronous model. 
We have shown and described only important activities considering the 
abstraction rate of designed model. We focused on the important actions 
from view point of the step stress testing and testing process of safety-
critical systems. 
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 The set of previous standard states is illustrated as an initial state 
PreviousStandardStates. This complex state starts as the first in our 
designed process of step stress testing. After specification of needed data of 
testing process it moves to the state Sampling with an input action. Its task 
is to describe the elements of tested system. The configuration of concrete 
elements as well as their repair in other test iterations is identified in this 
state. The created sample of tested system elements (and a whole testing 
process) is transferred into actual test iteration by an alerting of output 
event. 
The process moves to the state TestParameterSpecification by a 
preparation of testing sample. The input action identified an actual iteration 
where the testing process is. Its determination is important for an 
identification of an original fully censored test. Internal actions of this state 
process a modification of life cycle, setting of load values and specification 
of initial load rates. The task of an output action is to verify changed load 
values. After processing, there is an event AdjustedValues, which transfers 
a whole process to the state TestProcedureDefinition. 
Testing script from the previous iteration is loaded for its next 
modification after the gaining of this state. This state is specific with 
a generating of testing script which moves the testing process into the state 
TestExecution where the testing script is loaded. Created testing script must 
be verified first. 
The state TestExecution is a concrete test processing. The real testing 
process must be kept and all errors occurring during the testing process 
were documented. It means a fulfilment of basic requirements for test 
processing from perspective of safety-critical systems. It is important to 
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 collect and save all information needed from a perspective of testing of 
application communication. The main task of its output action is a saving of 
all gained data from an actual iteration. 
The test enters the state TestSummary after the reaching them where 
data is loaded in an actual iteration. This state has a task to summarize 
important information from an actual iteration and document them for 
a total test process. In case of the last iteration it is needed to determine the 
next process of testing. The result of this state is the protocol on test which 
is created with an output action. This protocol should be in an appropriate 
format for the next support tool. 
The event EvaluatedTest serves to initiate the next test iteration. The 
whole testing process is repeated when more than 50% of elements from 
testing sample in all iterations failed, or if an error occurs in the first 
iteration which presents the fully censored test. These conditions are based 
on standard processes of the step stress testing and they present conditions 
for test accomplishment. 
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 5. VERIFICATION OF THE DESIGNED TESTING MODELS 
 
Verification or validation must be processed to verify a correctness of 
the designed models of performance and step stress testing of 
communication subsystem of safety-critical control systems. The 
verification would approve if the designed models were created correctly 
considering their specification. The validation would focus on an approval 
of designed models in connection with real expectations and requirements 
of customers (41). 
The area of testing of safety-critical systems what our designed models 
of performance and step stress testing are focused on, present a concrete 
specified area. Specification of designed models can be gained with the 
analysis of concrete standards and guidelines. The problem is an 
identification of importance of particular requirements by testing of safety-
critical systems. The real customer requirements for testing of safety-critical 
systems are also difficult to reach. These requirements are mostly a part of 
internal company guidelines and they focus on a concrete and specified 
area. They are the part of a company know-how and no firm allows an 
application outside of firm. 
It is very difficult to process the validation when our designed testing 
models present a certain generalization or a unified process for a specified 
area. Therefore we have decided to verify the designed models against our 
specified requirements for testing. These requirements are based on the 
generalized requirements for testing of safety-critical systems which should 
be gained with an analysis of standards and guidelines for these systems. 
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 It is recommended to use an appropriate metrics for a definite 
verification process. Therefore we have defined metrics for our designed 
models which determines a completeness of implemented model 
requirements. Based on its value we will evaluate if the concrete model can 
be considered as verified. 
 
5.1 Metrics Proposal  
 
Our proposal of metrics was based on the standard metrics for 
software. We have analysed particular quality attributes for software 
products and we have identified an appropriate group. The standard metrics 
was selected from this group which will be a base for our proposal. 
The selected standard metrics was modified for a planned process of 
validation and the main parameters were defined. The specified 
requirements for testing of safety-critical systems were classified into three 
groups to simplify the validation process. 
 
5.1.1 Selection of Appropriate Metrics 
 
There are many standards defining a software quality and concrete 
metrics to secure them in the area of informatics including also safety-
critical computer systems. Therefore we have used the standard ISO 9126 
by a selection of suitable metrics. This one provides internal and external 
metrics for the quality of software products. 
Analysis of particular groups of quality attributes helped to identify 
the most suitable group of functional characteristics. Functionality can be 
defined as an ability of information system to include functions which 
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 secure the supposed or defined needs of users by a system application in 
defined conditions. They can be used for a measurement of a quality of 
product requirements fulfillment according to definitions in its assignment 
(42). This group of metrics is therefore suitable as a base for our verification 
of designed models. 
Considering the definition of validation process we have focused 
especially on internal metrics. These are used for measurement of product 
characteristics which cannot be deduced from its behaviour (42) 
This criterion limits particular quality attributes which do not have any 
internal metrics (for example functionality compliance). 
The identified suitability is the most ideal concrete functionality 
characteristic. This can be defined as an ability to provide functions for an 
ensuring of specified tasks and needs of user. It considers if the functions 
are available or not. Its basic internal metrics is a completeness of 
implemented functions which is defined as (42): 
B
AX −=1  ,                    [1] 
where  X is a value of metrics, 
A is a number of functions found by the control according to the  
specification, 
B is a number of functions in a specification. 
This metrics is completed with an operating with scales and it will 
present a base for our suggested metrics. 
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 5.1.2 Definition of Metrics 
 
We have defined the following metrics to verify our designed models. 
Its value will be considered as a criterion which will determine if the 
designed model follows or not the specified requirements. 
Name and identification 
Metrics determines the Integrity of Implemented Model Requirements. 
This gives a question what is the completeness of implementation of 
concrete requirements. It can be added to the internal metrics for an 
evaluation of adequacy which is one of the functionality characteristics. 
Definition 
Metrics for a determination of integrity of implemented functions is 
defined with a function: 
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where  X is a function of metrics, 
 A1 is a number of our implemented specified general requirements 
for testing, 
 A2 is a number of our implemented specified general requirements 
for test specification, 
 A2 is a number of our implemented specified general requirements 
for test processing, 
B1, B2 and B3 is a total number of our specified requirements for 
a concrete attribute, 
     and W1, W2 and W3 are their relative weights. 
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 Determination of weight of concrete attributes 
We have divided the designed models into three categories to simplify 
the verification of designed models. We determined a value of its 
importance for every category while we decided for the constant weight 
considering the testing area. It is especially because we cannot define the 
importance of requirements from perspective of testing of safety-critical 
systems. The constant weight brings problems in the calculation exactness 
and therefore we strengthened the general requirements for testing of safety-
critical systems. From this reason our specified requirements for testing 
have a concrete normalized value 4 (from the interval <1, 5>) and 
requirements for specialization and test processing has the normalized value 
3. The weight for very attribute was defined on the base of (43): 
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where Wi is a defined weight, 
Ei is a normalized attribute value from the interval <1, 5>. 
Values of weight of concrete attributes determined according to the  
[3] as well as their normalized values are in the Table 6. 
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 OVERVIEW OF ATTRIBUTES OF A PROPOSED METRICS                            
AND THEIR WEIGHT                                                                        Table 6 
Index Attributes 
Normalized 
value of 
attribute 
Weight 
1 Implemented our specified general 
requirements for testing 
4 0.4 
2 Implemented our specified general 
requirements for test specification 
3 0.3 
3 Implemented our specified general 
requirements for test processing 
3 0.3 
Dimension 
The defined metrics reaches values in the interval <0, 1>, the lower 
values of metrics mean a higher quality of designed model from perspective 
of our specified requirements for testing of safety-critical systems. This 
range presents a standard between metrics in the standard ISO 9126. 
Initial and Final Value 
The designed models are very specified therefore a determination of 
the final value is not easy. The intended application of designed metrics is 
a verification of our designed model and there are no previous values (or 
initial values) to simplify an estimation of required final value of metrics. 
Our designed models deal with the testing of safety-critical systems, so 
the achieved values of metrics should be as low as possible. It means that 
designed models should implement the highest number of our specified 
requirements for testing of safety-critical systems. 
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 Source of Data for Measurement 
Data needed for a determination of metrics value come from two basic 
sources. The first are our specified requirements which are a base for our 
designed model. These have been reached after analysis of standards and 
guidelines for safety-critical systems. Our specified requirements present 
particular attribute groups and we have to determine the implementation 
completeness. 
The second source is a concrete testing model of safety-critical system 
which we want to verify. The particular model implements requirements for 
testing of safety-critical systems and its partial actions and events must 
reflect and include these requirements. It does not need to be directly the 
specific actions or events but requirements can be included into concrete 
elements of the designed model. 
Processes of verification 
To determine the values of metrics it is needed to define requirements 
which are implemented by the concrete model. In our specification of 
requirements for testing of safety-critical systems we have identified 
concrete requirements which must be implemented in the specific testing 
models. It is important to classify them into one of the attribute groups 
which they represent. This step determines a total number of our specified 
requirements of concrete group. 
Then it is needed to analyse all steps, actions and states of a concrete 
testing model and to assign them into our requirements. Some requirements 
are implemented only in a verbal way therefore it is needed to add them to 
a concrete specified requirement. Based on this classification we can 
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 determine a number of implemented requirements in a concrete designed 
model. 
The value of proposed metrics is calculated after these parameters 
according to the [2], which determines the completeness of implemented 
requirements of a concrete testing model. 
 
5.2 Verification of Designed Model of the Performance Testing 
 
Verification of the designed model of performance testing was 
processed with our defined metrics. The requirements which could not be 
fulfilled have been excluded. We have identified a number of implemented 
requirements of concrete attributes according to the determined process of 
metric verification and based on them we calculated the values of metrics. 
The Table 7 illustrates the specified general requirements for testing, the 
concrete actions and steps which implement them. The total number of our 
specified requirements was 16, while 15 from them implement the designed 
model of performance testing.  
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 IMPLEMENTATION METHOD OF OUR SPECIFIED GENERAL 
REQUIREMENTS IN THE DESIGNED MODEL OF PERFORMANCE 
TESTING                                                                                             Table 7 
Specified requirement Method of Requirement 
Implementation 
Testing cases  
Data specification for 
testing 
Steps specifying required data in the phase 
TestCaseSpecification, 
Action defineTestData in a state 
ProblemDomainSpecification 
Determination of expected 
test results 
Step determineExpectedResults in the 
phase TestCaseSpecification 
Testing environment  
Definition of support tools 
for testing 
Step specifySupportTools in the phase 
TestProcedureSpecification 
Definition of support 
software for testing 
Step specifySupportingSoftvare in the 
phase TestProcedureSpecification 
Description of 
configuration of tested 
system 
Step describeConfiguration in the phase 
TestTransmittalReport 
Documentation  
Documentation of test 
results 
Step writePerfSessionData in the phase 
TestLog and other associated steps,  
Action of creation of 
createPerformananceSessionData in the 
state SessionExecution 
Documentation of aims 
and criteria fulfillment   
Analysis step analyzeTestResult in the 
phase TestSummaryReport, 
Action of  createTestLog in the state 
TestSummary 
Documentation of test 
errors 
Step of the recordError in the phase 
TestIncidentReport, 
Action of creation of 
createTestIncidentReport in the state 
SessionExecution 
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 Specified requirement Method of Requirement 
Implementation 
Configuration Data  
Input configuration data 
must be in an allowed 
range 
Step of verification of verifyInputData in 
the phase TestTransmittalReport 
Input configuration data 
mutst be approved 
combinations 
Step of verification of verifyInputData in 
the phase of TestTransmittalReport 
Data Communication  
Ensure a data correctness 
from perspective of 
transfered data 
In the text phases TestExecution and 
TestSummaryReport and in the state 
SessionExecution 
Secure a data transfer in 
a real time 
In the text phases TestExecution 
and TestSummaryReport in the state 
SessionExecution 
Support Tools  
Standardized process 
inputs of testing 
 
Standardized process 
outputs of testing 
Defined in the text phase 
TestSummaryReport, 
The action of createTestLog in the state 
TestSummary 
General  
Determined testing criteria 
for the test finishing 
Step of testCondition in the phases 
TestCaseSpecification and TestExecution, 
Event of testCondition moves the test from 
the state of  ProblemDomainSpecification 
into the state SessionCreation 
Reduction of number of 
input combination 
Steps of InputCombinationReduction and 
analysis in the phase 
TestCaseSpecification 
 
Then we have determined all our specified requirements for the test 
specification. The appropriate actions and steps of the performance testing 
model can be added. They are all illustrated in the Table 8. The total 
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 number of our specified requirements was 7. The designed model of 
performance testing implements them all. 
IMPLEMENTATION METHODS OF OUR SPECIFIED 
REQUIREMENTS FOR TEST SPECIFICATION IN THE                                                      
DESIGNED MODEL OF PERFORMANCE TESTING                    Table 8 
Specified requirement Method o requirement 
implementation 
Testing and Test Plan  
To document all non-tested 
components 
In the text phase of TestPlan 
To store a list of persons by 
the test 
In the text phase of TestPlan 
For every created test  
To determine input testing 
requirements for every test 
Included in the step of testObjectives in 
the phase TestCaseSpecification, 
The action defineTestData in the state 
ProblemDomainSpecification 
Scenario of Testing  
To label and name the test Step UniqueIdentifier in the phase 
TestCaseSpecification 
To determine prerequisite for 
testing 
Contained in the step of testObjectives 
in the phase TestCaseSpecification, 
Action of defineTestData in the state of 
ProblemDomainSpecification 
To define orders for test 
process 
Contained in the step of testObjectives 
in the phase TestCaseSpecification, 
Action of defineTestData in the state 
ProblemDomainSpecification 
To define activities for test 
accomplishment 
Step of returnToStandardState in the 
phase TestTrasmittalReport 
 
At the end we have selected specified requirements for testing process 
and we added concrete actions and steps implementing them to the 
requirements. This assignment is displayed in the Table 9. The total number 
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 of our specified requirements was 6, while the designed model of 
performance testing implemented them. 
IMPLEMENTATION METHOD OF OUR SPECIFIED REQUIREMENTS 
FOR TEST PROCESSING IN THE DESIGNED MODEL                                     
OF PERFORMANCE TESTING                                                        Table 9 
Specified requirement Implementation Method of 
Requirement 
For every test  
To save a real testing 
procedure 
Step of writeRealTestProcess in the 
phase TestLog, 
Action description of 
describeRealTestProcess in the state 
SessionExecution 
To save the test results Step of  RealTestProcessReport in the 
phase TestLog, 
Action of createTestLog creation in the 
state TestSummary 
To save a support project 
documentation 
Processed with concrete phases IEEE 
829 
Test Evaluation  
Final evaluation of test results 
(Pass / fail) 
Steps of analyzeIncident and 
evaluateIncident in the phase 
TestSummaryReport,  
Action of evaluateAllConflicts in the 
state TestSummary 
If test failed to classify it as 
a negative test 
In the text in the phase 
TestIncidentReport 
To determine the next process 
for failed tests 
Step of determineFurtherAction in the 
phase TestSummaryReport 
 
We calculated metrics value for the designed model of performance 
testing based on a number of our specified and implemented requirements 
for testing of safety-critical systems according to the [2]: 
6
3,06
7
3,07
16
4,0151)
6
6,
7
7,
16
15( ×+×+×−=X           [4] 
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 025,0)
6
6,
7
7,
16
15( =X .   [5] 
The lower the metrics value is, the more quality the designed model of 
performance testing is from a perspective of our specified requirements for 
testing of safety-critical systems. Considering the calculated metrics value 
(which is close to the ideal value) we can say that the designed model of 
performance testing follows the specified requirements.  
The designed model of performance testing can be considered as 
verified in relation to our specified requirements for testing of safety-critical 
systems. 
5.3 Verification of Designed Model of the Step Stress Testing 
Based on our defined metrics we made also a verification of the 
designed model of step stress testing. We did not include the requirements 
which cannot be fulfilled considering the character of the step stress test. 
Our specified general requirements for testing of safety-critical systems, we 
summarized them together with concrete actions and steps which implement 
them in the designed model of the step stress testing in the Table 10. The 
total number of our specified requirements was 17, while 16 of them 
implement the designed model of step stress testing. 
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 IMPLEMENTATION METHOD OF OUR SPECIFIED REQUIREMENTS 
IN THE DESIGNED MODEL OF STEP STRESS TESTING   
                                                                                                            Table 10 
Specified requirement Method of requirement implementation 
Testing cases  
Specification of data for 
testing 
More steps in the phase 
TestCaseSpecification, 
Event of gaining of 
gainedSpecificationOfRelevantData 
between the states PreviousStandardStates 
and Sampling 
Determination of expected 
test results 
Step for determineExpectedResults in the 
phase TestCaseSpecification 
Testing environment   
Definition of support tools 
for testing 
The step specifiySupportTools in the phase 
TestProcedureSpecification 
Definition of support 
software for testing  
The step specifiySupportSoftware in the 
phase in the phase 
TestProcedureSpecification 
Description of 
configuration of tested 
system 
The step describeConfiguration in the 
phase TestTransmittalReport, 
Action describeConfigruation in the state 
Sampling 
Documentation  
Documentation of test 
results 
The step writeCurrentIterationData in the 
phase of TestLog, 
The action of saving of 
saveCurrentIterationData in the state 
TestExecution 
Documentation of aims 
and criteria fulfillment 
Steps of  evaluation and testResults in the 
phase TestIncidentReport  
Documentation  of test 
failures 
The recordError in the phase TestLog,  
Action of recordErrors in the state 
TestExecution 
Documentation of 
corrections and process of 
repair actions by failure 
The step recordCorrection in the phase 
TestTrasmittalReport 
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 Specified requirement Method of requirement implementation 
Configuration data  
Input configuration data 
must be in an approved 
range 
The step verifiyDimensions in the phase 
TestTrasmittalReport 
Input configuration data 
must have approved 
combinations 
The step verifiyDimensions in the phase 
TestTrasmittalReport 
Data communication  
To secure a data 
correctness from 
perspective of transferred 
data 
In text phases TestLog 
and TestSummaryReport and on the state 
TestExecution 
To secure a data transfer in 
a real time 
In text phases TestLog 
and TestSummaryReport and in the state 
TestExecution 
Support Tools  
Standardized inputs of 
testing process 
 
Standardized outputs of 
testing process 
In text phases TestSummaryReport and 
In the state TestSummary 
General  
Determined testing criteria 
after accomplishment of 
test 
Defined in test process characteristics. 
Reduction of number of 
input combinations 
The reductionOfDimensions in the phase 
TestCaseSpecifications. 
 
Then we added the next specified requirements for specification of 
tests to concrete steps which implement them in the designed model of 
stress testing. All are in the Table 11. The total number of our specified 
requirements was 7, while the designed model of step stress testing 
implemented them all. 
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 IMPLEMENTATION METHOD OF OUR SPECIFIED REQUIREMENTS 
FOR TEST SPECIFICATION IN THE DESIGNED MODEL OF STEP 
STRESS TESTING                  Table 11 
Specified Requirement Method of requirement 
implementation 
Testing and Testing Plan  
Documentation of all non-
tested components 
In text phase TestPlan 
Keep a list of persons by the 
test 
In text phase TestPlan 
For every created test  
Every test has to have input 
requirements for testing 
Many steps in phase 
TestCaseSpecification,  
Event 
gaindedSpecificationOfRelevantData 
between the states 
PreviousStandardStates and Sampling 
Testing Scenario  
Definite labeling and name 
of test 
The Step uniqueIdentification in the 
phase TestCaseSpecification 
Determination of 
prerequisites for testing 
The step specifyTestProcess in the phase 
TestCaseSpecification 
Defining of orders for test 
processing 
The step specifyTestProcess in the phase 
TestCaseSpecification 
Defining of activity for test 
accomplishment 
The step fixParts at the end of iteration 
in the phase TestTransmittalReport or 
the action fixParts in the state Sampling 
 
At the end we determined an implementation method of our specified 
requirements for testing. These requirements with implementing steps are 
summarized in the Table 12. The total number of our specified requirements 
was 5. The designed model of the step stress testing implements all these 
requirements. 
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 IMPLEMENTATION METHOD OF OUR SPECIFIED REQUIREMENTS 
FOR TESTING IN THE DESIGNED MODEL OF STEP STRESS 
TESTING                                                                                           Table 12 
Specified Requirement  Implementation Method                                 
of Requirement 
For every Test  
To save a real testing 
procedure 
The step writeRealTestProcess in the 
phase TestLog, the action 
writeRealTestProcess in the state 
TestExecution 
To save the test results  The writeCurrentIterationData in the 
phase TestLog, the event 
receivedResultsOfTheTest among the 
states TestExecution and TestSummary 
To save a support project 
documentation 
Proceeded with particular phases IEEE 
829 
Test Evaluation  
Definte evaluation of test 
results (Pass / fail) 
In text phase TestSummaryReport 
To determine the process for 
test which failed 
The step determineFurtherAction in the 
phase TestSummaryReport, the action 
determineFurtherAction in the state 
TestSummary 
 
We have calculated a value of metrics for designed model of step 
stress testing based on a number of our specified requirements for testing of 
safety-critical systems and their implementation according to the [2]. 
5
3,05
7
3,07
17
4,0161)
5
5,
7
7,
17
16( ×+×+×−=X             [6] 
024,0)
5
5,
7
7,
17
16( =X .      [7] 
The lower the value of metrics is, the more quality the designed model 
of step stress testing has. It is from perspective of our specified 
126 
 requirements for testing of safety-critical systems. Considering the 
calculated value of metrics (closer to zero, closer to the ideal value) we can 
say that the designed model of step stress testing fulfils requirements. 
The designed model of step stress testing can be considered as verified 
to specified requirements for testing of safety-critical systems. 
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 6. ACHIEVED RESULTS  
 
The main aim of this monograph is the model design of a step stress 
and performance testing of safety-critical systems. It was necessary to 
specify requirements for testing of safety-critical systems and to process 
various support activity during testing. 
At the beginning we have analysed relevant standards and guidelines 
for safety-critical systems. The standard IEEE 829 was analysed first which 
focuses on a documentation and concrete process phases of testing software. 
The next was the standard IEC 61508, which is the basic standard for 
safety-critical systems. The next standards were IEC 50128, IEC 61511, 
CAP 670, DO-178B, IEC 62061 and guideline MISRA representing the 
main regional and product standard and guideline for specific areas of 
safety-critical systems. The standards IEC 60880, IEC 61513, IEC 62138, 
IEC 60987 and IEC 61226 were excluded from the previous group of 
standards and guidelines for area of nuclear power stations. At the end we 
analysed the guideline GAMP which focuses on validation of automated 
systems. 
The analysed standards are specialised prevailing on integration 
testing. System testing is mentioned only as one of the tests which must be 
made. Requirements gained in analysis must be generalized. Except of 
testing we have focused on the requirements from perspective of data 
communication which must be considered by testing of communication 
subsystem. 
Concrete areas of safety-critical systems are enough specific that they 
cannot be included into model design. We would have to know an exact 
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 specification and details of concrete tested system by a model design on this 
level. 
Therefore we have decided to focus on the testing of safety-critical 
systems in general. We have applied the general requirements for safety-
critical systems which were specified into details with using of knowledge 
from regional and product standards and guidelines including the standards 
and guidelines for nuclear power plants. According to these requirements 
we have identified differences and specified requirements for testing of 
safety-critical systems. 
Based on the analysed standards we have identified and suggested 
basic steps of design and development of safety-critical systems. The 
analysed standards and guidelines do not include a design and development 
of system testing so it was needed to implement them there. We have 
defined actions and requirements for every step of our designed process.  Or 
we defined those which must be followed by the process. We identified and 
specified requirements and data for system testing of safety-critical systems. 
Our suggested steps as well as specified requirements and data were 
captured with appropriate UML diagrams. 
Based on our specified requirements for testing and previous design 
we started with a design of models system testing of communication 
subsystem by safety-critical control systems. We focused on two types of 
test systems, specifically the step stress and performance testing. These 
models are based on the same outputs while each is specialised on testing of 
other system aspects. Both models implement our specified requirements 
for testing of safety-critical systems as well as our specified requirements 
for testing of communication subsystem. 
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 The designed model of performance testing is focused on testing of 
performance of safety-critical system. It is orientated on a concrete testing 
process and concrete states which occur by the testing. To reflect particular 
perspectives we applied the diagrams of the model language UML (concrete 
sequential and state diagrams). 
On the other hand the designed model of step stress testing is focused 
on reliability and robustness of safety-critical systems. We identified a step 
continuity of the step stress testing for standard systems before a concrete 
design. These steps were used as a base for propose of testing process and 
identification of states which can occur. To display them we used the 
appropriate diagrams of language UML (concrete diagrams of activities, 
sequential and state diagrams). 
Suggested testing models had to be verified after their creation. Due to 
the fact that the safety-critical systems are in a specific area where the real 
documents are difficult to reach, there were suggested testing models to be 
verified in connection to specified requirements for testing. We have 
suggested metrics for their verification and we defined its parameters. The 
suggested metrics helps to reach values which we use when we want to 
determine the range of implementation of specified requirements for testing 
of safety-critical systems. 
Concrete aims of the monograph can be considered as fulfilled based 
on the previous evaluation of gained results. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
Today, there is a higher emphasis on safety, not only in specific areas 
such as nuclear power engineering and the air industry, but also in common 
industry in a wider sense. One of the priorities of the European Union is 
certification in various spheres and it is also focused on safety in different 
spheres.  
The systems with tasks to keep safety of controlled process or 
equipment are called safety-critical systems. Failure of these systems can 
have catastrophic consequences and it can endanger health, human lives or 
environment. The word “critical” has the task to emphasize possible causes 
in their failure. These systems are designed with a certain level of security. 
There are more factors which can harm them. Safety of these systems must 
be approved and therefore also tested. 
Designed testing models focus on the testing of safety-critical systems 
as a whole. Their base is the system testing which can start after integration 
testing. We used the standard system testing by their design. These were 
completed with requirements for testing of safety-critical systems.  
We have proposed two models of system testing made by the step 
stress and performance testing. Each of these system tests uses a different 
principle and it evaluates a system from another perspective. Both models 
are measured for testing of communication subsystems. The area of safety-
critical systems is very specific so the designed model operates with 
a certain rate of abstraction. The model which would reflect concrete 
actions had to be proposed for a concrete system and to know its 
specification. 
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 Proposed models can be enlarged from many points of view. It is 
possible to complete them with more detailed steps for a concrete safety-
critical system or to focus on a specific area. Or the steps can be added 
which are required with other standards or to specialise on other system 
area. Or other perspectives on proposed testing processes can be created 
with use of other UML diagrams. 
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